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ESSAYS ON ASSET MARKETS AND SELF-ASSESSED HEALTH STATUS
Tekin Kose, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2014
This dissertation consists of three chapters on individual decision making in asset markets
and subjective assessment of health status. The rst chapter studies price convergence in as-
set markets with indenite duration induced by existence of bankruptcy risk. By introducing
increasing and decreasing fundamental value paths via experimental methodology, this chap-
ter extends knowledge about tradersincentives in asset markets with indenite horizons. In
most cases, the data indicate signicant undervaluation of assets without a buyback value
under bankruptcy risk regardless of fundamental value regime. The transaction prices closely
follow the fundamental value trend of the asset supported by a terminal value in both de-
nite and indenite time horizons with constant fundamentals. The second chapter uses cross
country survey data from Turkey and the United States to analyze determinants of gender
di¤erences in self-assessed health status. Ordered logit models are estimated to quantify the
e¤ects of factors that prove important in self-rated health outcomes. While some ndings
on the relationship between socioeconomic status indicators and self-assessed health level
match earlier results, signicant gender gap remains even with controls for chronic illnesses.
Hierarchical ordered probit estimation reveals that reporting thresholds are signicantly af-
fected by gender of the respondents in both countries. The last chapter explains the gender
di¤erences in self-assessed health status by providing a theoretical identication mechanism
via dynamic model which allows for heterogeneity in discount factor of individuals. Theoret-
ical implications are empirically tested and estimation results support the structural model
implications. We conclude that accounting for heterogeneity in individual discount factors
explains substantial portion of the gender gap in self-assessed health status.
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1.0 PRICE CONVERGENCE AND FUNDAMENTALS IN ASSET
MARKETS WITH BANKRUPTCY RISK: AN EXPERIMENT
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Asset market e¢ ciency draws remarkable attention in economics and nance. History has
borne witness to dramatic welfare losses of societies due to extensive price uctuations within
many markets: e.g. the Dutch tulipmaniaof 1630s or the stock market crash of the Great
Depression. The signicant changes to the NASDAQ share index in the early 2000s are just
a recent example of a bubble and crash which refers to a period of rapidly increasing prices
with a sudden decline towards the end (Dufwenberg et al. (2005)(37)). The latest world-wide
nancial crisis of 2008 is also associated with a bubble in mortgage backed securities and
stock market crashes, which led to huge welfare losses for the world economy. Mispricing
of nancial assets, especially securities backed by mortgage system, is widely considered to
be the initial cause of the recession1. Thus, asset market e¢ ciency is again proven to be a
crucial area of concern not only for economists, but also for public policy makers.
Asset market decisions are associated with uncertainties for economic agents, especially
during economic downturns. For instance, many rms including Lehman Brothers led for
bankruptcy during the U.S. mortgage crisis of 20082. Moreover, sovereign debt problems of
many countries increase the probability of government defaults and debt rescheduling, even
moratorium or repudiation in extreme cases. During the moratorium of 2001, Argentina
1See Acharya and Richardson (2009)(1) for a discussion.
2According to the OECD (2012)(93), number of rms ling for bankruptcy signicantly increased in
the United States and Europe in 2009. OECD Index for number of bankruptcies is 312 for U.S. in the
third quarter of 2009 whereas the base year (2006) index is 100. For France and United Kingdom, the
corresponding index is 124 and 138, respectively, during the second quarter of 2009.
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bonds were priced at 25% of their face value (The Economist (2002)(114)). Recently, in
April 2010, Greek government bonds were classied at junk bond level due to concerns over
country default. The risks of default (bankruptcy) induce an indeniteness on the lifetime
and market values of stocks and government securities. Thus, investors often need to make
decisions given the stochastic nature of asset markets where they run the risk of ending
up with junk assets. Although the indenite nature of decision making in asset markets is
frequently observed, previous research mainly focuses on other aspects of markets to explain
bubbles and crashes.
In an e¤ort to understand the phenomenon of bubble and crash, my study analyzes mar-
kets for assets with bankruptcy risk. In these markets, referred to as asset markets with an
indenite duration, all assets have a common and xed probability of becoming worthless af-
ter every trading period3. The questions proposed: Do asset markets with indenite duration
exhibit di¤erent outcomes than xed horizon markets? Do prices converge to fundamental
values for indenitely lived assets? Do di¤erent fundamental value trends a¤ect outcomes in
asset markets with bankruptcy risk? The study takes advantage of experimental tools to set
up asset markets with bankruptcy risk in order to analyze the e¤ect of di¤erent fundamental
value trends on pricing and e¢ ciency.
Previous asset market experiments tested the e¢ cient market hypothesis and mainly
pointed out that trading prices signicantly deviate from known fundamentals. Most ex-
perimental results are observed in an asset market with a declining fundamental value in a
nite horizon (Smith et al. (1988)(108); King et al. (1993)(72)). Overpricing of an asset
with decreasing fundamental value during middle periods of a xed horizon market and an
end-of-game market crash are robustly replicated ndings. Experiments on constant funda-
mental value and nitely lived assets provided mixed results. Having di¤erent designs, some
indicated price bubbles for at fundamental value assets (Caginalp et al. (1998)(16); Nous-
sair et al. (2001)(92); Bostian et al. (2006)(12)), whereas others reported price convergence
(Kirchler et al. (2012)(74); Huber et al. (2012)(62)). Two studies considered an asset with
increasing fundamentals and found persistent undervaluation of the asset in a xed horizon
3If bankruptcy outcome is observed, then all assets are destroyed and the market closes. Asset life time
and market duration have identical probability distribution. Thus, I use terms "indenitely lived asset
markets," "asset market with indenite duration" and "asset market with bankruptcy risk" interchangeably.
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market (Davies (2006)(33); Huber et al. (2012)(62)). On the other hand, Caginalp et al.
(2002)(17) and Giusti et al. (2012)(49) reported price convergence for an increasing funda-
mental value asset under certain conditions. Very few papers have investigated experiments
on assets with bankruptcy risk (Camerer and Weigelt (1993)(18); Ball and Holt (1998)(6);
Hens and Steude (2009)(60)). All of them considered only a at fundamental value for the
asset and they reported mixed results due to di¤erences in their experimental designs. Hens
and Steude (2009)(60) observed undervaluation of the asset in treatments with fewer num-
bers of participants and price bubbles with larger number of traders. Camerer and Weigelt
(1993)(18) indicated price convergence from below in some sessions as well as price bubbles
for others, which have di¤erent number of traders and subject pool. Finally, Ball and Holt
(1998)(6) ran a classroom experiment in which participants traded an indenitely lived asset
with a xed dividend and a buy back value if the asset survived a ten period market game.
Trading decisions were made by groups in this experiment. The authors did not employ any
other comparable treatments and reported price bubbles for an asset with terminal value4.
This study rst aims to identify the e¤ects of di¤erent fundamental value regimes on price
convergence for indenitely lived assets by using a comparable set up induced only by changes
in a dividend process. Second, this study focuses on constant fundamental values with and
without a terminal value, and then introducing increasing and decreasing fundamental value
trends for indenitely lived assets. Finally, the study provides a direct comparison between a
xed horizon asset market and an indenitely lived asset market with constant fundamentals.
I closely follow the recent literature and introduce a bankruptcy risk into design of Kirchler
et al. (2012)(74), which used an asset with zero expected dividends and a terminal value.
In the baseline treatment, the life-time of all assets and thus, the market duration are
determined by a die roll. Therefore, the dividend process and the information structure
are signicantly di¤erent from previous studies of innitely lived asset markets. There is
only one change in the dividend structure across treatments to create di¤erent fundamentals
which allows me easily compare market outcomes. There are four Market Treatments: 1)
Constant Fundamentals with Terminal Value, 2) Constant Fundamentals without Terminal
4I use the terminal value and buy back value interchangeably in order to refer to the assets which are
convertible into cash at the end of a market game depending on the experimental design.
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Value, 3) Decreasing Fundamentals, 4) Increasing Fundamentals.
Experimental data indicate signicant underpricing of assets with bankruptcy risk if there
is a lack of buyback value. Only constant fundamental value assets, backed by a terminal
value, reveal price convergence in indenite horizon markets. Combining results with Kirchler
et al. (2012)(74), this study reveals that both denitely lived and indenitely lived markets
have price convergences for an asset supported by a buy back value. However, independent of
fundamental value paths (constant, decreasing, increasing), indenitely lived asset markets
without a terminal value experience mispricing of the asset in most markets. Unlike most
previous ndings of nite horizon market experiments, this study reports undervaluation
of assets in some markets with decreasing fundamentals. Moreover, I discuss risk aversion,
time-varying perceptions of risk, biased belief formation of subjects and price anchoring
as potential explanations for the undervaluation of assets in the indenite horizon. The
next section discusses the related experimental literature in detail. Then, I describe the
experimental set-up and design details. After discussing the results and presenting the data
analysis, I conclude.
1.2 RELATED LITERATURE
There is an extensive theoretical, empirical and experimental research on the e¢ ciency of
asset markets. Theoretical models focus on transaction prices as a means of information
transmission in nancial markets, but there is a dearth of empirical evidence due to a lack
of precise conclusions since statistical criteria may fail to capture crucial insights of asset
markets (Sunder (1995)(112)). Field data and/or theoretical models alone cannot lead to
full understanding of the phenomena of bubbles and crashes in asset markets. Laboratory
experiments allow researchers to induce fundamentals and compare those with actual prices,
which are not possible in the eld5. This paper relates to two branches of the literature
on experimental asset markets and aims to set up a bridge between them by providing a
direct comparison between denitely lived and innitely lived asset markets with di¤erent
5Porter and Smith (2003, p. 7)(101) indicated an advantage of experimental tools: In the economy,
control over fundamental value and investor information is rarely possible and therefore minimal conditions
for studying the role of expectations in stock market valuations cannot be identied.
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fundamental values. First, I provide a review of the literature on nite time horizon asset
market experiments and then I focus on indenitely lived asset market experiments.
The e¢ cient market hypothesis6 implies that all relevant information in a market should
be reected by transaction prices and thus, prices should be consistent with fundamentals.
However, there is signicant evidence suggesting that asset prices deviate from market fun-
damentals. The classic work of Smith et al. (1988)(108) reported that in an asset trading
environment with a nite time horizon and a stochastic dividend structure, more than half of
market experiments created price bubbles, trade in high volumes at prices that are consid-
erably at variance from intrinsic values(King et al. (1993)(72), p. 2), followed by crashes
relative to fundamental value. While observing price bubbles in experimental markets, many
studies focused on checking robustness of them to di¤erent institutions and treatments7.
Literature on experimental asset markets mainly focused on markets with declining fun-
damental values. However, assets may follow di¤erent fundamental value paths depending
on their type and properties. A more realistic approach is the consideration of other paths,
such as stochastic, and increasing fundamentals as noted by Oechssler (2010)(94) and Smith
(2010)(107). Some studies focused on this issue and investigated asset markets with at and
increasing fundamentals. Although the payment of a single dividend at the end of a trading
horizon reduced size of bubbles, markets with constant fundamental values still experienced
bubbles (Caginalp et al. (1998)(16); Smith et al. (2000)(109); Noussair et al. (2001)(92);
Bostian et al. (2006)(12); Bostian and Holt (2009)(11)). However, Kirchler et al. (2012)(74)
and Huber et al. (2012)(62) reported price convergence in a constant fundamental value
environment with xed horizons. Davies (2006)(33) and Huber et al. (2012)(62) considered
6See Fama (1970)(40) for a review.
7Some studies tested treatments such as transaction fees, limiting price changes, using call markets,
changing cash to asset ratio, having experienced traders, eliminating speculation, employing tâtonnement
pricing mechanism (King et al. (1993)(72); Caginalp et al. (2001)(15); Porter and Smith (2003)(101);
Lei et al. (2001)(77); Dufwenberg et al. (2005)(37); Lugovskyy et al. (2011)(82)). Many treatments did
not help eliminate price bubbles with exception of short sales which induced underpricing for a declining
fundamental asset (Haruvy and Noussair (2006)(57)). However, Caginalp et al. (2001)(15) showed that an
asset market bubble may be reduced by simultaneous existence of low cash to asset ratio, deferred dividends
and a publicly open bid-ask book. Another e¤ective treatment in signicantly eliminating price bubbles was
experienced traders (Porter and Smith (2003)(101); Lei et al. (2001)(77); Dufwenberg et al. (2005)(37);
Hussam et al. (2008)(63)). Moreover, detailed and careful introduction of asset market environment and
framing of fundamental value process are shown to be e¤ective in reduction of price bubbles in experimental
asset markets (Lei and Vesely (2009)(78); Cheung et al. (2010)(25); Kirchler et al. (2012)(74)).
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a nitely lived asset market with increasing fundamental value. Both papers indicated per-
sistent undervaluation (negative bubble) of an asset with increasing fundamentals. On the
other hand, Caginalp et al. (2002)(17) reported price bubbles for an increasing fundamental
value asset when the asset coexisted with a speculative asset in the market. They showed
that prices converge to fundamentals when two non-speculative assets are simultaneously
traded. Another study, by Noussair and Powell (2009)(91), reported price bubbles for an
asset market with non-monotonic fundamentals. Finally, Giusti et al. (2012)(49) observed
price convergence for an asset with increasing fundamentals induced by the existence of
interest payments on cash holdings.
There are fewer studies which focus on indenitely lived asset markets. Camerer and
Weigelt (1993)(18) reported mixed results on price convergence in a market for an asset with
indenite life-time and constant fundamental value regime. Their data revealed slow price
convergence to fundamental values from below for some markets whereas others had price
bubbles. Similarly, Ball and Holt (1998)(6) observed overpricing for an indenitely lived asset
with constant fundamentals and bankruptcy risk. Both studies employed an asset-specic
bankruptcy risk, which led to di¤erent survival periods for di¤erent assets unlike the current
experiment. However, Ball and Holt (1998)(6) reported results from a group decision making
experiment since there were ve trading teams in their asset market. In a more recent study,
Hens and Steude (2009)(60) observed an asset market with constant fundamental value
and found mixed results on price convergence. A session exhibited price bubbles similar to
Ball and Holt (1998)(6) whereas some revealed undervaluation of the asset. Finally, Du¤y
and Crocket (2010)(30) applied an indenite horizon experiment in which subjects trade
an asset with a bankruptcy risk to smooth consumption. They observed both positive and
negative bubbles due to treatment e¤ects. It should be noted that each of these previous
studies had its own focus and there were signicant experimental design di¤erences across
these studies such as number of traders, dividend structure, number of trading periods,
bankruptcy determination rule, provision of a buyback value, subject pool, etc. Thus, a
comparison of results across these studies is di¢ cult.
This study aims to identify the e¤ects of di¤erent fundamental value regimes on price
convergence for assets with bankruptcy risk by using a systematic and comparable set up.
6
Unlike Ball and Holt (1998)(6), the experimental design in this study consists of a stochastic
dividend process and a random number of trading rounds leading to an indenite life for
all assets. Moreover, I introduce constant fundamentals with no terminal value as well as
increasing and decreasing fundamental value trends in indenitely lived asset markets which
existed neither in Camerer and Weigelt (1993)(18) nor in Hens and Steude (2009)(60). The
baseline treatment uses design of Kirchler et al. (2012)(74). Thus, the dividend process and
information structure are signicantly di¤erent from earlier studies of innitely lived asset
markets. Table 18 summarizes experimental design and illustrates related literature9. There
are four treatments which allow a comparison of results across di¤erent fundamental value
regimes. Treatment 1 helps with identifying e¤ects of bankruptcy risk on bubble measures
compared to that of a at value asset lacking bankruptcy risk. I compare the data of
Treatment 1 with a at fundamental value treatment of Kirchler et al. (2012)(74), which is
called Treatment 0 in this paper, to provide a comparison between a denite horizon market
and markets with indenite horizons. Treatment 2 drops the terminal value of the asset
and adds a dividend structure with positive expected payment. By comparing Treatments
1 and 2, I di¤erentiate between assets with and without terminal value. Only the dividend
structure changes across these two treatments keeping fundamental value constant. Another
contribution of my experimental design is to consider declining and increasing fundamental
values in an indenitely lived asset market byTreatment 3 and Treatment 4. Thus, this
paper complements the literature by providing comprehensive experimental results on asset
markets with di¤erent fundamental value trends in indenite horizon.
8(1) KHS (2012): Kirchler et al. (2012)(74); (2) NRR (2001): Noussair et al. (2001)(92); (3) CPS (1998):
Caginalp et al. (1998)(16); (4) CIPS (2002): Caginalp et al. (2002)(17); (5) BH (1998): Ball and Holt
(1998)(6); (6) HS (2009): Hens and Steude (2009)(60); (7) CW (1993): Camerer and Weigelt (1993)(18);
(8) SSW (1998): Smith et al. (1988)(108); (9) KSWV (1993): King et al. (1993)(72);(10) NP (2009):
Noussair and Powell (2009)(91); (11) SVBW (2000): Smith et al. (2000)(109); (12) HKS (2012): Huber et
al. (2012)(62).
9Existence of bubbles in a denitely lived asset market with decreasing fundamentals is a robust nding
and replicated by many other studies. I cite only two early papers here.
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Table 1: Experimental Design and Related Literature
Fundamental Value
Time
Horizon
Constant with TV Constant without TV Decreasing Increasing
Fixed
Treatment 0
KHS (2012)
NRR (2001)
SVBW (2000)
CPS (1998)
SSW (1988)
KSWV (1993)
Others
Davies (2006)(33)
NP (2009)
CIPS (2002)
HKS (2012)
Indenite
Treatment 1
BH (1998)
Treatment 2
HS (2009)
CW (1993)
Treatment 3 Treatment 4
1.3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
120 students from the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL) subject pool
are recruited for this study. There are 12 sessions, each with 10 participants. Each subject
is allowed to participate in only one session. The experiment is conducted with z-Tree
(Fischbacher (2007)(44)) and I modied the software code used by Kirchler et al. (2012)(74).
Subjects are provided with instructions which include information on trading mechanisms,
the dividend structure, fundamentals and bankruptcy determination rules10.
The study uses a between-subject design by having di¤erent subjects for each treatment
session with ten traders. Each trader has an endowment portfolio to start. There are
two types of endowments: experimental cash and assets, A. Subjects start with one of the
following endowment types: Endowment 1=(20A,3000) or Endowment 2=(60A,1000). Thus,
half of the subjects start with the same endowment randomly assigned by the computer. The
trading mechanism is a Double Auction in which sellers and buyers have the options to make
asks and bids. Depending on the duration of a market, subjects may participate in more
than one market in the session. If there is a market re-start, endowments are randomly
re-assigned. Participants earn experimental currency during the market game(s) and these
are converted into dollars for real payment at the end of a session. If a subject participates
10Experimental instructions include all relevant information and a multiple choice quiz to check subjects
understanding of market conditions. Subjects are given time to complete their answers for the quiz and the
experimenter checks their answers to make sure that they get correct answers and enhance their understand-
ing. A sample of instructions is provided in Appendix.
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in more than one market, one/two of the markets is/are randomly chosen for payment. In
addition to earnings from market(s), participants receive a show-up fee.
This study formulates the main hypothesis for price convergence in all markets according
to the e¢ cient market hypothesis. This theory assumes that investors react quickly to
new information in a market and rational expectations exist. Then, updated information is
reected in prices and market fundamentals. Moreover, I calculated the expected value of
future payments from an asset under the assumption of risk-neutrality.
Main Hypothesis: Prices follow fundamentals in asset markets with bankruptcy risk.
The fundamental value (FV) of an asset for period t is determined by the following
equation: FV (t) = TV+
PT
s=t r
s tE(ds); where E(ds) is the expected dividend for the asset
at period t = 1; 2; 3; :::; T  f10;1g and TV is the terminal value.
1.3.1 Treatment 0: Fixed Horizon-Constant Fundamentals with Terminal Value
Treatment 0 is the at fundamental value treatment of Kirchler et al. (2012)(74), which
has 10 trading periods. An asset of this market has two types of equally likely dividend
payments: f 5; 5g with an expected dividend of zero. In addition to dividend payments, an
asset has a terminal value of 50 experimental cash to be collected at the end of a market.
Thus, the fundamental value of an asset is constant at 50 for each period. I used data from
this previous experiment for comparison and provide a detailed analysis in Appendix11.
1.3.2 Treatment 1: Constant Fundamentals with Terminal Value
Treatment 1 introduces bankruptcy risk into Treatment 0 leading to an indenite number
of trading periods. For each market, Treatment 1 has 8 trading periods in expectation. A
market has an extra trading period with a probability of 87:5%: After each trading period,
there is an 8-sided die roll by participants to determine the assetslife-time. If the die roll
reads 1, then all assets are worthless and the market ends. Namely, an asset market is closed
11One may argue that results across two studies may not be comparable due to experimenter xed e¤ects
and/or subject pool e¤ects. However, I already observe price convergence in Treatment 1 which is an
indenite version of Treatment 0. Given that the PEEL subjects follow fundamentals for pricing an asset in
this indenitely lived market, they will easily gure out pricing an asset in xed horizon markets. Thus, I
choose not to replicate ndings of Kirchler et al. (2012)(74) but use their data for comparison.
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with probability of 12:5%: Then, the continuation probability of a market is r = 0:875; which
generates an expected duration of eight periods12. An asset still has a terminal value of 50
if a market ends. Thus, the fundamental value of an asset is 50 for any period. Since the
expected dividend payments are zero for each period, the fundamental value of an asset
is equal to its terminal value. Thus, the results of this treatment can be compared with
Treatment 0.
1.3.3 Treatment 2: Constant Fundamentals without Terminal Value
Using positive expected dividend payments, this treatment considers a at fundamental
value for the asset which is not supported by a terminal value. Unlike Treatment 1, the
terminal value is replaced by positive expected dividend payments. An asset has two types
of equally likely dividend payments: f0; 12g: The continuation probability is r = 0:875 and
the expected duration of a market is still eight periods. For any period t, the fundamental
value of an asset is given by: FV (t) =
P1
t=1 r
t 1E(dt) =
P1
t=1 6(
7
8
)t 1=
6
1  (7=8)= 48: Thus,
the fundamental value of an asset in this treatment is 48 EC for any period.
1.3.4 Treatment 3: Decreasing Fundamentals
This treatment is identical with Treatment 2, except for the dividend process. In each
period, the expected dividend of an asset is declining, inducing an innitely lived asset
with declining fundamentals. A market has a continuation probability of r = 0:875 and
an expected duration of eight periods. The time-varying dividend structure is illustrated in
Table 2. The expected dividend is determined by E(dt) =
1
2
(57  t) and the fundamentals
are given by FV (t) = 200  4t for any period t. The fundamental value of an asset without
a terminal value for a given period t is given by the following: FV (t) =
P1
s=t r
s tE(ds),
where E(ds) is expected dividend for an asset at period t = 1; 2; 3;...
An asset in Treatment 3 has a declining fundamental value trend and exhibits the fol-
lowing expected dividend payments for any period s: E(ds) =
1
2
(57  s):
12Expected Duration =
1
1  r =
1
1  0:875 =
1
0:125
= 8:
10
Table 2: Average Holding Value: Treatment 3
Period Expected Dividend Dividend Set Fundamental Value
1 28 {0,56} 196
2 27.5 {0,55} 192
3 27 {0,54} 188
4 26.5 {0,53} 184
5 26 {0,52} 180
... ... ... ...
10 23.5 {0,47} 160
... ... ... ...
15 21 {0,42} 140
... ... ... ...
21 18 {0,36} 116
... ... ... ...
25 16 {0,32} 100
... ... ... ...
29 14 {0,28} 84
... ... ... ...
Combining equations, one obtaines: FV (t) =
57
2
P1
s=t r
s t 1
2
P1
s=t r
s ts.
Reparametrizingm = s  t and usingP1m=0 rm= ( 11  r ); P1m=0mrm= r(1  r)2 ; I write:
FV (t) =
58  t
2(1  r) 
1
2(1  r)2 : Finally, for r = 0:875, one obtains: FV (t) = 200  4t:
1.3.5 Treatment 4: Indenite Life-Increasing Fundamentals
This treatment is identical with Treatment 3 except for the dividend process. In each period,
the expected dividend of an asset is increasing unlike Treatment 3 and this structure induces
an innitely lived asset with an increasing fundamental value. A market has the same
continuation probability of r = 0:875 and an expected duration of eight periods. The time-
dependent dividend structure is illustrated in Table 3. The expected dividend is given
by E(dt) =
1
2
t and fundamentals are calculated as FV (t) = 28 + 4t for any period t. The
fundamental value of an asset is calculated by following the steps of the previous section. An
asset in Treatment 4 has an increasing fundamental value trend and exhibits the following
expected dividend payments for any period s: E(ds) =
1
2
s. Combining the fundamental value
and the expected dividend equations, one obtains: FV (t) =
1
2
P1
s=t r
s ts:
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Table 3: Average Holding Value: Treatment 4
Period Expected Dividend Dividend Set Fundamental Value
1 0.5 {0,1} 32
2 1 {0,2} 36
3 1.5 {0,3} 40
4 2 {0,4} 44
5 2.5 {0,5} 48
... ... ... ...
10 5 {0,10} 68
... ... ... ...
15 7.5 {0,15} 88
... ... ... ...
21 10.5 {0,21} 112
... ... ... ...
27 13.5 {0,27} 136
... ... ... ...
37 18.5 {0,37} 176
... ... ... ...
Reparametrizingm = s  t and usingP1m=0 rm= ( 11  r ); P1m=0mrm= r(1  r)2 ; I write:
FV (t) =
r
2(1  r)2+
t
2(1  r) . Finally for r = 0:875, one obtains: FV (t) = 28 + 4t:
1.4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS
I analyze experimental data using di¤erent measures for comparison of prices with fundamen-
tal values. First, the main hypothesis is tested by paired t and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
I also present two bubble measures suggested in the literature (Stockl et al., 2010(111)).
Then, the gures of all transaction prices, the median, the mean and the last transaction
price are plotted for each session. Finally, I discuss the portfolio adjustments of traders.
1.4.1 Tests, Bubble Measures and Portfolio Adjustments
Statistical test results mostly indicate that prices are signicantly di¤erent from fundamen-
tals for assets with bankruptcy risk, regardless of the fundamental value path. Since prices
and fundamentals are not independent in asset markets, I employ comparison tests for de-
pendent samples. Table 4 provides paired t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test results for
12
the main hypothesis. The fourth row reports the results of paired t-test comparing all trans-
action prices with fundamental values of the corresponding session. In the fth row, I report
results of Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the di¤erence of transaction prices and fundamental
values. The seventh and eight rows indicate test results using weighted mean prices as a
price measure for each trading period of markets. I use data for the two longest markets for
each session. For instance, the rst two sessions of Treatment 2 have only one market. In all
sessions of Treatment 2 and Treatment 4, multiple markets are observed. For most markets,
transaction prices signicantly di¤er from fundamentals according to Table 4. However, rows
seven and eight indicate that the weighted mean prices of the rst markets are not statisti-
cally di¤erent from the fundamentals for some sessions such as the third session of Treatment
1 and second sessions of Treatment 2 and Treatment 4. All second markets provide evidence
to reject the main hypothesis of the experiment. Moreover, analysis of data for Treatment
0 indicate that there are also mixed results on price convergence for an asset with constant
fundamentals in a xed horizon market. Thus, test results provide partial evidence to reject
the null hypothesis that prices follow fundamentals.
Price convergence in experimental asset markets is often evaluated by the criteria of
bubble measures. Stockl et al. (2010)(111) asserted that measures of mispricing should
change monotonically with respect to the di¤erences among prices and fundamental values.
The authors also discussed that Relative Absolute Deviation and Relative Deviation are in-
dependent of total number of trading rounds and absolute level of fundamentals.13 Since
this paper considers markets with di¤erent numbers of trading periods and di¤erent funda-
mental value paths, these two measures are appropriate for comparing di¤erent treatments.
Relative absolute deviation (RAD) indicates aggregate level of mispricing. "RAD is easy
to interpret, as e.g., a value of 0.10 means that on average mean prices per period di¤er
10 percent from the average fundamental value in the market" (Stockl et al., 2010(111), p.
290). Relative deviation (RD) considers thr raw di¤erence between the fundamentals and
the weighted mean prices and measures overvaluation of an asset in a market. A positive
(negative) value of RD indicates an overvaluation (undervaluation).
13RAD =
1
N
P
t
(Pwt   FVt)FV  RD = 1NPt (P
w
t   FVt)FV  ; where N is total number of trading periods, FV
is mean fundamental value in a market and Pwt is volume-weighted mean prices.
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Table 5 indicates bubble measures for sessions of each treatment. Most markets exhibit
underpricing of the assets since all RD values are negative except the initial markets in the
second sessions of treatment two and treatment four. Measures for markets with constant
fundamentals backed by terminal values indicate that there are small deviations from fun-
damentals compared to other treatments. In the rst treatment, the average transaction
price per period deviate by 1% from the average fundamental value of assets in session two
and session three. In treatment zero, price deviations are less than 5% except for session
four which exhibits a RAD value of 0.36.14 Although deviations from fundamentals are sta-
tistically signicant for some markets as indicated by the previous table, bubble measures
indicate that these di¤erences are very small.15 In sum, for most markets, transaction prices
closely follow fundamentals for assets supported by a buy back value under bankruptcy risk.
For constant fundamental value assets without buy back value, results indicate large devi-
ations from fundamentals. RAD values of this treatment range from 0.42 to 0.72. Overall,
bubble measures provide evidence for negative price bubbles in this treatment. Results for
markets with decreasing fundamentals provide mixed results. The rst and last sessions
indicate existence of underpricing and large price deviations whereas second session reveals
price bubbles after sixth period. The lowest RAD of the treatment is 0.24 whereas in the
rst market of session three, RAD reads 0.56. Finally, in treatment four, price divergence is
observed for the markets with increasing fundamentals. RAD values of this treatment range
from 0.21 to 0.63. Second markets exhibit higher deviations with RADs over 40%. In sum,
most markets without terminal value mostly exhibit large undervaluation of the asset (i.e.
negative price bubble).
1.4.2 Treatment 1: Constant Fundamentals with Terminal Value
In the rst session of this treatment, I observe two markets. The rst one lasts 11 periods
whereas the second one has 12 trading rounds. After the rst one, subjects participate in the
second one by getting their randomly assigned portfolios. Thus, participants experience a
market restart with possibly di¤erent endowments. In late periods of the second market, the
14See Appendix for Treatment 0 analysis.
15For instance, the hypothesis that prices are equal to 49.5 is not rejected for session two of treatment one.
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Table 5: Bubble Measures
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
Market 1 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
RAD 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.60 0.42 0.72 0.46 0.24 0.59 0.21 0.41 0.30
RD -0.06 -0.01 -0.003 -0.60 0.02 -0.72 -0.34 -0.009 -0.59 -0.13 0.07 -0.29
N 11 8 8 5 5 9 21 25 8 5 7 10
Market 2
RAD 0.02 0.54 0.60 0.70 0.45 0.49 0.44 0.63
RD -0.02 -0.54 -0.60 -0.70 -0.45 -0.47 -0.43 -0.63
N 12 9 9 5 15 13 13 8
Notes: 1) I consider longest two markets of each session, if available. 2) S1=Session1, S2=Session2, S3=Session3.
continuation probability, i.e. the bankruptcy risk, is changed. Namely, at period 20 and 22,
the market ending probability is increased to 25% and 37.5% respectively.16 In all gures, the
market changes are shown by a black long-dashed line whereas the market ending probability
changes are shown by a gray short-dashed line. Figure 1 reveals the transaction prices for
each period. The variance of transaction prices is higher in the rst market than in the
second. Except for a couple of observations in the early trading periods, transaction prices
are close to fundamentals in these markets. Prices converge to fundamentals from below.
In the second and third sessions, similar price movements are observed. The second part of
Figure 1 indicates the mean, the median and the last price of trading periods in this session.
The paths of these statistical indicators of prices are also close to fundamentals. Thus, as
long as an asset is backed by a terminal value, prices follow fundamentals for an asset with a
at fundamental value regime under bankruptcy risk. However, traders accept prices lower
than the terminal value in compensation for avoiding the risk of receiving negative dividends.
The results of this treatment are consistent with those provided by Kirchler et al.
(2012)(74) as these authors observe price convergence in a nite version of the treatment.
This study provides a robustness check and indicate that even in an indenitely lived asset
market, constant fundamentals supported by terminal value exhibit price convergence from
below. Bankruptcy risk does not impact on price convergence since subjects are guaranteed
16A change in bankruptcy risk does not impact fundamentals in this market. However, I calculate the
e¤ect of changing continuation probability on fundamentals in Treatment 3 and Treatment 4, which are given
in Appendix. This feature of experimental design incorporates time-varying discount rates in asset markets
as discussed by Cochrane (2011)(27).
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to get a terminal value for an asset. Finally, in markets of the rst session, two subjects
preferred to hold higher numbers of assets whereas another two held very low numbers of
assets. During the second market, period 19, the number of assets held by two participants
was 42% of total assets. Portfolio holdings in other markets are relatively balanced in this
treatment. In the rst market of the second session, two subjects held 35% of the total
assets at the end. The highest share for the total assets held by two participants in the rst
market of the third session is 41%. Thus, the distribution of assets among traders was fairly
balanced in this treatment.
1.4.3 Treatment 2: Constant Fundamentals without Terminal Value
In the rst session, subjects participate in ve markets. The second session reveals data
for two markets and the last session consists of three markets. Transaction prices are less
volatile in the later markets of all sessions. This is evidence for a market restart e¤ect on
market prices. Subjects employ their past knowledge to make decisions in the new markets.
However, this behavior does not help prices catch up with the fundamentals. Except fo
a couple of periods in the early markets, transaction prices are signicantly lower than
fundamentals in markets of this treatment. Figure 2 plots transaction prices for assets of this
treatment. The mean, the median and the last price of periods move together and they are
far below fundamentals except in early markets of the rst and second session. The absence
of a terminal value has a dramatic impact on pricing behavior traders. Risk of getting a
worthless asset at the end of a market leads traders to accept lower prices. The mean and the
median prices uctuate between 6 and 24, half and twice of the positive dividend payment,
12. Coupled with the absence of the buyback value, the bankruptcy probability leads to an
underpricing of an asset. Subjects are likely to overweight the bankruptcy risk especially
after experiencing a default for the assets they hold. Moreover, the data on asset holdings
of participants reveal extreme portfolio choices in this environment. In the second market
of rst session, the total number of assets held by two participants was 219, more than 50%
of total assets. At the end of fth market, period 20, one participant holds 70% of the total
assets. Similarly, in the second market of the second session, 62% of the total assets is held
17
Figure 1: Trading Prices for Treatment 1 (Constant Fundamentals with Terminal Value)
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by two participants. Finally, at the end of the second market in session three, the number
of assets held by one participant is 314 (79% of the total assets).
1.4.4 Treatment 3: Decreasing Fundamentals
Treatment 3 yields mixed results. The rst session starts with a one period market and
the second market lasts longer for 21 periods. In the late periods of the second market,
the continuation probability is lower. Namely, at period 17 and 21, the market ending
probability is increased to 25% and 37.5% respectively.17 Figure 3 reveals all transaction
prices, the mean, the median and the last price for each period. The variances of transaction
prices decrease over time. Similar to the previous treatments, there is evidence for a restart
e¤ect on market outcomes. In most trading periods, transaction prices are lower than the
fundamental value of an asset with a declining fundamental value path. The mean, the
median and the last price of periods have similar trends and move below fundamentals.
During the middle periods of session one, transaction prices settle down around 70, which is
less than the adjusted fundamental values. As the fundamentals decline, unlike in the nite
horizon markets, this session reports underpricing initially and end of market price bubbles.
In the third session, the level of prices is higher than in the rst session. However, both
markets of this session exhibit prices which are still signicantly below the fundamentals. The
second session exhibits the highest prices of this treatment in a long duration market. The
trading prices are below fundamentals during the early periods. After the sixth period the
market generates a positive bubble with a relative deviation of 26%. Thus, the second session
results are similar to previous bubble ndings of declining fundamental value treatments
in a xed horizon. Unlike the stylized positive bubble and end of game crash nding of
the literature in nitely lived treatments, asset market with decreasing fundamentals and
bankruptcy risk yields a negative bubble in both the rst and the last session. Similar to
the second treatment, risks of having a worthless asset at the end of the market lead traders
to accept trading at lower prices. Subjects may also have overweighted bankruptcy risk,
17Using original fundamental values, instructions state that there may be a change in bankruptcy risk.
For the markets with changes in the bankruptcy risk, adjusted fundamental values are used in gures and
tables. Approximations for fundamentals are shown in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Trading Prices for Treatment 2 (Constant Fundamentals without Terminal Value)
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especially after experiencing a market end, leading to underpricing of an asset. There are
unequal portfolio allocations in this treatment. In the second market of the rst session,
period 22, the number of assets held by two participants corresponds to 63% of the total
assets. The second session generates more extreme results similar to Camerer and Weigelt
(1993)(18). In the second market of this session, a participant collects 97% of the total assets,
which may decrease the supply of assets and drive bubbles in the market. Finally, in the
second market of session three, the number of assets held by two participants corresponds
to 60% of the total assets.
1.4.5 Treatment 4: Increasing Fundamentals
The rst session has four markets whereas the second and third sessions have three markets.
The probability of bankruptcy is increased to 25% in late periods of the fourth market for the
rst session and the third market of second session. Figure 4 reveals the transaction prices,
the mean, the median and the last price for each period. The volatility of transaction prices
decreases over time in all markets of the treatment. Mean, median and the last price of the
periods move together and they are signicantly below fundamentals for many markets. In
early trading periods of each session, prices start higher than the fundamentals. However,
most markets experience negative price bubbles during the later periods. For instance,
during the middle periods of the fourth market in session one, transaction prices settle down
around eight. In the third market of the second session, prices are relatively stable around
12. The results of this treatment are consistent with the ndings of the previous literature
on nitely lived markets. Similar to the second and third treatments, the risk of ending up
with junk assets leads traders to accept lower trading prices. Subjects probably overweight
the default risk and price an asset on the basis of potential positive dividend payment of
a period. Moreover, I observe many short markets in this session due to the design of the
experiment.18 Trading prices decrease as subjects experience a bankruptcy for their assets
and thus, the restart worsens mispricing of an asset. Cash-to-asset ratio is increasing in these
markets due to potential positive dividend payments. Thus, underpricing of an asset is more
18Die roll by participants determine bankruptcy and life of an asset. This set up has a tradeo¤ between
running very short markets and having a convincing design for probabilistic duration of a market.
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Figure 3: Trading Prices for Treatment 3 (Decreasing Fundamentals)
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Figure 4: Trading Prices for Treatment 4 (Increasing Fundemantals)
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Table 6: Ginis Concentration Ratio for End of Market Asset Allocations
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Endowment 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Market 1 0.44 0.31 0.34 0.71 0.33 0.80 0.60 0.88 0.41 0.34 0.40 0.47
Market 2 0.43 - - 0.77 0.61 0.73 - - 0.57 0.61 0.62 0.53
Notes: 1) I consider the longest two markets for each session, if available. 2) S1=Session1. S2=Session 2. S3=Session3.
likely to have resulted from a bankruptcy experience e¤ect rather than from a shortage of
cash.
Unequal portfolio allocations are similar to previous asset markets without terminal
value. During the fourth market of the rst session, in period 18, the number of assets held
by two participants corresponds to 75% of the total assets. Half of the participants held zero
assets in this specic period. In the third market of session two, period 18, 69% of the total
assets is held by two participants. Finally, in the last market of third session, the number of
assets held by two participants was 220 (55% of the total assets).
1.4.6 Explanations for Results
Experimental data indicate signicant underpricing for assets with bankruptcy risk if there is
no buy back value. I suggest that risk aversion; time varying perceptions of risk; biased beliefs
due to probability weighting and price anchoring are all explanations for this underpricing
behavior in asset markets with indenite duration.
As noted above, the portfolio allocations of traders are highly imbalanced in markets
without a terminal value. In these markets, a small number of traders collect the majority
of assets whereas many traders prefer holding a small amount of assets. In order to avoid
bankruptcy, many participants quickly converted their assets into cash at low prices. The
rst explanation for this behavior of traders is risk preferences. Relying on a risk-neutrality
assumption, expected fundamental value calculations do not account for heterogeneity in
risk preferences of traders. The experimental design of this study does not include risk
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preference elicitation of subjects due to time and budget constraints. However, previous
research reveals that risk preferences a¤ect decision making in experimental asset markets.
Fellner andMaciejovsky (2007)(41) reported that risk averse traders are less active in markets
with xed horizons. Risk averse agents submit fewer bids and asks and complete less trading
contracts. Similarly, Robin et al. (2012)(102) found less mispricing lower asset turnover when
the fraction of more risk averse participants is higher in a market. Moreover, Crockett and
Du¤y (2010)(30) showed that the number of shares acquired by subjects in an indenitely
lived market is a¤ected by their Holt-Laury (2002)(61) risk tolerance measure. Crockett and
Du¤y (2010, p. 4)(30) noted the following:
"The higher prices in the linear exchange rate economies are driven by a concentration of
shareholdings among the most risk-tolerant subjects in the market as identied by the Holt-Laury
measure of risk attitudes. By contrast, in the concave exchange rate treatment, most subjects
actively traded shares in each period so as to smooth their consumption in the manner predicted
by theory; consequently, shareholdings were much less concentrated."
Table 6 shows Ginis concentration ratio for the end of market asset allocations in the
two longest markets of each session. This measure of inequality lies between zero and one,
where zero indicates equal distribution of assets among traders and one implies that a sub-
ject holds all the assets in a market. The rst row indicates that the concentration ratio
for endowment allocations is 0.25 for all treatments. The highest concentration ratio, 0.88,
is observed in session three of treatment three. In treatment one, asset allocations are rel-
atively more balanced compared to other treatments. Treatment two reveals concentration
ratios higher than 0.60 except the rst market of session two. The lack of a terminal value
signicantly a¤ects traders portfolio adjustments. Many second markets of treatment four
exhibit more unequal allocations compared to the rst markets of the same session implying
that participants are inclined to prefer more extreme portfolio choices once they experience
a bankruptcy of an asset. Thus, asset allocation data is consistent with the result of Crock-
ett and Du¤y (2010)(30) implying that risk preferences have a role in the decision making
process of traders in asset markets with indenite duration. Moreover, Croson and Gneezy
(2009)(31) found that women are more risk averse than men. Given previous experimental
ndings on risk aversion and portfolio allocation, gender became an instrument for risk aver-
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Table 7: OLS Results: Asset Holdings and Gender
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
Female 9.00 -52.77** -24.69 -18.88**
[8.34] [8.37] [17.77] [4.35]
Constant 34.60 21.05 55.20 25.94***
[14.36] [10.59] [27.26] [2.06]
R2 0.023 0.202 0.042 0.078
N 40 60 40 60
Notes: 1) I pooled data of the longest two markets for sessions of each treatment, if available.
2) Each session has di¤erent number of trading rounds and di¤erent numbers of markets are observed.
3) All regressions include control variables for asset endowment, number of periods and number of female traders.
4) Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at session level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
sion in this study. Table 7 provides regression results for the end of market asset holdings
and gender. The estimation results indicate a negative coe¢ cient for a female dummy vari-
able for markets without terminal value. Females are likely to hold more assets than men if
there is a terminal value. A lack of terminal value led females to run away from assets under
bankruptcy risk. Thus, on average, female participants hold fewer assets than men in most
markets. Finally, time-varying perceptions of risk could have played a crucial role in the
decisions of participants. Friedman and Kuttner (1992)(46) discussed that investors percep-
tion for risks associated with holding di¤erent assets may change quickly due to subjective
and/or objective factors. Similarly, Guiso et al. (2013)(53) indicated that measures of risk
aversion for clients of Italian banks changes crucially after the 2008 nancial crises. Authors
found via experiment that this behavior is mostly resulted from an emotional response to a
scary experience. Findings of the current experiment is consistent with Guiso et al. (2013)
results. Participants of indenite horizon markets exihibit di¤erent pricing behavior after
experiencing a bankruptcy similar to behavior of bank clients in Italy.
Biased belief formation of participants may also have a¤ected their decisions in this
experiment. Subjects are faced with two types of uncertainty in this experiment: 1) Uncer-
tainty of dividend payments and 2) Uncertainty of asset life, i.e. number of trading periods.
Traders may overweight both bankruptcy risk and under/overweight the likelihood of div-
idend payments. For instance, mean and median prices of treatment two ranges from 6 to
26
24, half and twice of positive dividend payment. Subjects overweight bankruptcy risk and
anticipate that the market will have one or two additional trading rounds although expected
duration of a market is eight rounds after each die roll. Heterogeneity in perceived bank-
ruptcy probabilities and biased beliefs of subjects lead di¤erent valuations of an asset among
traders. Thus, prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979(69)) may o¤er an explanation
for the decision making of participants in markets for assets with bankruptcy risk.
Observing underpricing of an asset with increasing fundamentals, Huber et al. (2012)(62)
discussed that "anchoring" is a strong explanation for price deviations in experimental asset
markets19. The experimental set up of asset markets provides di¤erent information sets for
the participants. First, before trading, subjects read instructions and absorb information on
fundamental value processes, the properties of an asset, trading mechanism, payment rules
and answer a questionnaire/quiz. Then, during trading rounds, subjects receive additional
information such as bids, asks, transaction prices, trading history, dividend realizations.
The second set of information plays a dominant role in tradersdecisions since they get this
information set more frequently. Thus, past prices are more likely to serve as an anchor
compared to the fundamental value of an asset. Huber et al. (2012)(62) ran additional
treatment in which they display fundamental values on trading screen and the data provide
support for their explanation since they observe more e¢ cient market prices. Moreover, by
studying xed horizon experimental markets Haruvy et al. (2007)(58) provided evidence
that traders beliefs about prices are mainly based on previous trajectories both in current
and past markets in which they participated.
In the current experiment, I do not provide fundamental value information on the trading
screen. However, the fundamental value table is shown on a screen in PEEL via the help
of a projector during the experiment. In Table 8, I present OLS regressions for the current
and past transaction prices as an evidence for price anchoring. Although fundamentals
signicantly correlate with prices, there is a signicant relationship between the current and
previous prices in most sessions. The coe¢ cient for the rst lag of transaction prices, ranging
from 0.335 to 0.849, is positively signicant for all treatments and all sessions. Similar to the
19Similarly, Caginalp et al. (2000)(14) also considered prices as an anchor and they discuss a momentum
model which predict the changes transaction prices as a function of current price levels and fundamentals in
an experimental asset market.
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previous literature, there is strong evidence that prices serve as an anchor in this experiment.
In sum, risk aversion, biased beliefs and price anchoring can explain the experimental results
for signicant undervaluation of the assets with bankruptcy risks. Finally, trading prices
have a path dependence since participants follow past prices as an anchor and their decisions
are crucially a¤ected by previous experiences of bankruptcy. Path dependence is evidenced
by large drops in prices following a bankruptcy.
1.5 CONCLUSION
Fragile nancial systems increase debt defaults and bankruptcy risks, which signicantly
a¤ect market functioning and social welfare. Investigating the e¢ ciency of asset markets
with bankruptcy risk, this study improves our understanding of individual incentives leading
to bubbles and crashes. This study complements the literature by introducing asset mar-
kets with di¤erent fundamental value trends without a buyback value in indenite horizon.
Specically, the rst experimental results for indenitely lived assets with increasing and de-
creasing fundamental value paths are presented. Data indicate negative price bubbles across
a spectrum of di¤erent paths for fundamentals including rising, declining and stable regimes.
Namely, regardless of a fundamental value regime, there is a signicant underpricing of as-
sets in most markets under a bankruptcy risk. Prices follow fundamentals for assets with a
terminal value in a at fundamental value regime for both the xed and indenite horizons,
i.e. independent of bankruptcy risk.
In contrast to most previous nite horizon asset market experiments, this study also re-
ports undervaluation of an asset in a decreasing fundamental value regime. Similar to most
previous research, I report underpricing for an asset with increasing fundamentals. More-
over, experimental results indicate extremely unequal portfolio allocations in indenitely
lived asset markets. Faced with the risk of ending up with worthless assets and potentially
overweighting the bankruptcy risk, most traders sell their assets at low prices. Additionally,
portfolio allocations exhibit a gender e¤ect implying that females are less likely to hold as-
sets under bankruptcy risk. Time-varying risk perceptions and the path dependent behavior
of traders may provide additional explanations for market outcomes in indenite horizons.
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Similar to earlier experiments, there is evidence for price anchoring in asset markets with
indenite duration. Past transaction prices are crucial indicators for traders to decide on
their bids and asks in double auction trading mechanisms. There is a signicant relationship
between current and previous period prices implying that the latter serves as an "anchor" for
the former. Using experimental tools, we observe that the mispricing of an asset is formed
independently of fundamentals in asset markets with indenite duration if there is a lack
of buy back value. Unlike the end of game crashes of nite horizon market experiments,
assets with bankruptcy risk are signicantly underpriced throughout whole market trading
rounds. My ndings imply that the e¢ cient market hypothesis is not su¢ cient to predict
market outcomes in indenitely lived asset markets, i.e. for assets with bankruptcy risk.
Assumptions of the e¢ cient market hypothesis are violated by participants. First, traders
do not react quickly to new information such as a market restart due to path dependency
and price anchoring. Rational expectations assumption does not hold due to behavioral
biases. Moreover, assuming risk-neutrality, fundamental value calculations do not account
for heterogeneity in risk aversion of traders. Thus, behavioral models should be employed
to predict trader activities and market outcomes in indenitely lived asset markets.
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2.0 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN SELF-REPORTED HEALTH STATUS:
CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY AND THE UNITED
STATES
Co-authored with Mehmet Ali Soytas
2.1 INTRODUCTION
It is widely observed that men and women experience di¤erent health outcomes. In many 
countries, the life expectancy of men is shorter than that of women (Mathers et al. 
(2001)(86); Barford et al. (2006)(7)). According to the World Health Organization(120), 
the global life expectancy of women is 71 years whereas that of men is 66 years. The 
literature indicates gender di¤erences in self-reported outcomes as well as in morbidity and 
mortality rates (Ok- suzyan et al. (2008)(95)). Moreover, it is also documented that a 
persons health status is a¤ected both by demographics and socioeconomic factors. 
Identication and analysis of these interactions would have implications for public health 
policy1. Although females have more doctor visits and spend more on personal health care, 
they tend to report lower health status than men in survey data.
There are two main hypotheses regarding the social mechanisms that might account for
gender di¤erences in health outcomes. The di¤erential exposure hypothesis suggests that
women report lower health level than men due to higher levels of demands and obligations
in their social roles and lower levels of resources to help them cope with these conditions.
1According to World Bank (WDI) data, public health expenditures correspond to 9.5% of GDP for U.S.
and 5.1% of GDP for Turkey in 2010 (53.1% and 75.2% of total health expenditures, respectively). Moreover,
there are gender di¤erences in health expenditures. For instance, female per capita health spending is 32 %
more than that of male spending in the U.S during 2004 (Cylus et al. (2011)(32)).
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It follows that equivalent social role conditions and equal resources should eliminate gender
di¤erences in health. On the other hand, the di¤erential vulnerability hypothesis makes ref-
erence to womens greater reactivity or responsiveness to life events and ongoing strains that
are experienced in equal measure by men and women. Therefore, social roles and resources
are related to health in di¤erent ways for men and women. However, neither hypothesis nds
full empirical support from data. The coe¢ cient of a gender indicator remains signicant
when di¤erent measures for income and household structure are taken into account in various
estimations (Walters et al. (2002)(121); Denton et al. (2004)(35)). Another branch of the
literature suggests that di¤erences in the perception of health and heterogeneity in reporting
behavior may lead to systematic di¤erences in self-rated health levels. Namely, respondents
may use di¤erent mapping structures between their true (objective) health levels and self-
assessed health levels. Thus, two individuals with same objective health level may report
di¤erent health status due to systematic di¤erences in their thresholds (Sen (2002)(105); Ju-
rges (2007)(68); Peracchi and Rossetti (2008)(99); Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004)(81);
Kapteyn et al. (2007)(70)).
Understanding systematic di¤erences in self-reported health status of sub-populations
would be critical since survey data is inuential in the formation of health policies for many
countries2. However, signicant attention is mostly paid to high income countries and this
generates a drawback for generalizability of previous ndings. In an e¤ort to shed more light
on the issue, in this study, we use cross-country survey data to investigate gender di¤erences
in self-assessed health status and determine direction of relationship between demographics,
socioeconomic variables, self-reported health level and reporting thresholds. Are there gen-
der di¤erences in self-assessed health status? Do demographics and socioeconomic variables
a¤ect the self-rated health status and reporting thresholds? We present data from a develop-
ing country, Turkey, and a developed country, the United States. Ordered logit models are
employed to quantify factors that prove important in self-reported health level. After testing
for the exposure and the vulnerability hypotheses, we estimate a hierarchical ordered pro-
2National Center for the Health Statistics of the U.S. writes the following description for the National
Health Interview Survey: "Survey results have been instrumental in providing data to track health status,
health care access, and progress toward achieving national health objectives."
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bit (HOPIT) to identify heterogeneity in response styles. Consistent with previous ndings
from other countries, the estimation results reveal a signicant gender gap in self-reported
health statuses for both Turkish and American respondents. Results for the relationship
between demographics, socioeconomic variables and subjective health status mostly repli-
cate previous ndings. Namely, females report signicantly lower subjective health statuses
than males in both countries. The older the individual is, the more likely she/he will report
lower self-assessed health status. The probability of reporting higher levels of health status
increases with education and family income level.
We report partial evidence for both the exposure and the vulnerability hypotheses: (1)
After controlling resource variables, we observe a decline in coe¢ cients of female indicators
in estimations. However, there exists a signicant gender e¤ect implying that the exposure
hypothesis is not, by itself, su¢ cient enough to account for a gender gap in self-reported
health status. (2) Tests of the vulnerability hypothesis indicate signicant interaction terms
for gender and some resource variables in both samples implying partial support for the
vulnerability hypothesis to explain the gender di¤erences. However, we nd that the gender
gap does not disappear even after controlling chronic conditions. Unlike previous ndings
(Case and Paxson (2005)(21); Malmusi et al. (2012)(83)), the estimation results with inclu-
sion of chronic conditions report signicant gender di¤erences in self-reported health status
for both American and Turkish individuals. Similar to the ndings of Lindeboom and van
Doorslaer (2004)(81) with Canadian sample, we provide evidence for signicant gender e¤ect
on reporting thresholds. Finally, we note that the di¤erent labeling of the scales in surveys
prevents a direct comparison between the U.S. and Turkey.
The next section discusses the related literature. Describing the data sets, Section 3
presents variables and estimation results. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 RELATED LITERATURE
Gender di¤erences in health outcomes are well documented by previous research. The lit-
erature, mostly based on self-reported data, revealed that women have higher morbidity
rates than men; whereas men have higher mortality rates (Verbrugge (1985)(117); Ver-
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brugge and Wingard (1987)(118); Nathanson (1975)(89); Nathanson (1977)(90); Fernandez
et al. (1999)(42); Oksuzyan et al. (2008)(95); Case and Paxson (2005)(21)). Inconsis-
tency in morbidity and mortality measures is called the gender paradoxin health related
research3. Although women live longer on average, they do su¤er from medical issues in-
cluding depression, various chronic illnesses, disability and they report lower health statuses
in general (Baum and Grunberg (1991)(8); McDonough and Walters (2001)(87); Verbrugge
(1985)(117); Case and Paxson (2005)(21); Malmusi et al. (2012)(83); Schon and Parker
(2008)(104); Crimmins et al. (2010)(29); Bourne and Brooks (2011)(13)). Moreover, some
research showed that the inclusion of chronic illness measures eliminates gender di¤erences
in self-reported health status (Case and Paxson (2005) (21); Malmusi et al. (2012)(83)).
A branch of the literature reported a link between inequalities in health outcomes and
socioeconomic variables such as income, education, employment and demographics (Gachter
et al. 2012(48); Idler and Benyamini (1997)(66); Arber (1997)(3); Denton and Walters
(1999)(34); Marmot et al. (1997)(84); Gupta et al. (2011)(54)). There is also evidence
indicating a relationship between age, gender and self-reported health. For instance, Case
and Deaton (2003)(20) suggested that gender di¤erences in self-reported health lessened at
older ages whereas others reported no gender di¤erence during old age (Arber and Cooper
(1999)(4); Leinonen et al. (1997)(79)). Although signicant gender di¤erences are doc-
umented by the literature, there is not a clear conclusion on the mechanisms which lead
to gender di¤erentials in health outcomes. The biological4 and social di¤erences between
men and women are initial candidates for explaining the results. Bird and Rieker (1999)(9)
discussed that social processes may create, preserve and/or increase the already existing
biological sex-related health di¤erences. Thus, health inequalities between men and women
could be resulted from social conditions, biological factors or combination of both. Another
line of research indicated that women tend to use more health services than men do; how-
ever, men have higher hospitalization rates. These ndings may imply that women are more
cautious with their health than men and tend to use health services even with minor prob-
lems whereas men could wait for the latest and serious stages of an illness (Oksuzyan et al.
3See Oksuzyan et al. 2010(97) and Denton et al. 2004(35) for a detailed analysis of related literature.
4See Oksuzyan et al. (2010)(97) an analysis of related literature.
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(2010)(97)).
Considering the social factors, researchers point out two hypotheses to explain gender
di¤erences in health: the "di¤erential exposure" hypothesis and the "di¤erential vulnera-
bility" hypothesis. The "di¤erential exposure" hypothesis states that women have lower
access to health-related materials and social factors enhancing health. For instance, Arber
and Cooper (1999)(4) emphasized that women and men have di¤erent occupations, as well
as, di¤erent income levels. Reviewing the relevant studies, Denton et al. (2004)(35) stated
females report lower health levels since they face more obligations and higher demands in
their social life. Although women experience more social support, they have lower levels
of perceived control and self-esteem. Moreover, women are found as single parents more
frequently than men and they su¤er from more stress due to their marital role and gender5.
Thus, women report lower levels of health (Denton et al. (2004)(35)).
The "di¤erential exposure" hypothesis implies that gender inequality in health outcome
is mainly based on socioeconomic factors. Once we control for socioeconomic status and
available resources, there would be no gender di¤erences in health outcomes. The "di¤erential
vulnerability" hypothesis claims that there are gender di¤erences in reported health levels
since women and men react di¤erently to the materials and social factors that a¤ect health.
The previous research points out that women and men react to stress in di¤erent ways.
Men are more sensitive to economic stressors whereas women are more likely to react social
stressors. However, the evidence on the e¤ect of stressful events on health is mixed6 (Denton
et al. (2004)(35)). Due to di¤erent reactions of men and women, health inequalities are
likely to persist according to di¤erential vulnerability hypothesis. Given that neither of
two hypothesis above have full empirical support, researchers point out that di¤erences in
reporting styles may also contribute to systematic di¤erences in self-rated health level. Dowd
and Zajakova (2010)(36) stated that self-reported health measures should be used carefully
since they are a¤ected by socioeconomic conditions. People with di¤erent socioeconomic
statuses may have di¤erent perceptions and expectations of health, which can easily lead to
5Some researchers emphasized that lifestyle of women is di¤erent than that of men. Women are less likely
to smoke, consume alcohol, follow unhealthy diets, to be overweight and to be physically active (See Arber
and Cooper (1999)(4); Denton et al. (2004)(35); Oksuzyan et al. (2010)(97) ).
6See Denton et al. (2004)(35) for an analysis of related literature.
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reporting heterogeneity (Dowd and Zajakova (2010)(36); Johnston et al. (2009)(67)). Sen
(2002)(105) discussed that subjective perception of morbidity may be extremely misleading
since it may or may not depend on social context. Studying survey data from European
countries, Jurges (2007)(68) concluded that consideration of di¤erences in response styles
reduce the cross country variations in self-reported health status. Furthermore, by analyzing
European data Peracchi and Rossetti (2008)(99) found that gender and regional di¤erences in
self-assessed health level are reduced by control of di¤erences in response types. Lindeboom
and van Doorslaer (2004)(81) studied Canadian surveys and reveal that reporting thresholds
are signicantly a¤ected by gender and age. Using a vignettes methodology, Kapteyn et
al. (2007)(70) showed that residents of the U.S. and the Netherlands use di¤erent response
scales to report work disability. In the current study, we cannot provide a direct comparison
across the U.S. and Turkey since survey data do not include measures of for vignettes for
two countries.
Another line of literature discussed and tested the reliability of self-reported survey mea-
sures for health outcomes. Researchers show that self-reported surveys/interview data and
health examination data provide similar health measures (Heliovaara et al. (1993)(59); Mar-
tikainen et al. (1999)(85)). On the other hand, some studies report di¤erent results and
imply that one should be careful when interpreting survey data to make policy recommenda-
tions. Studying Mexican data, Parker et al. (2010)(98) found that obese people are likely to
overreport their height and tend to underreport their weight. Authors also stated that a large
part of the sample was not aware of their chronic diseases such as diabetes and hypertension
(Parker et al. (2010)(98), pp. 22-23). Another study, by Baker et al. (2004)(5), discussed
that self-reported measures may create large attenuation biases due to measurement errors.
2.3 DATA AND VARIABLES
We employ data from Turkish household surveys, Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
(SILC), for 2006 and the U.S. National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) for 2011. The
survey question for self-reported health (SRH) reads: "What is the status of your health?"
Respondents choose one of the categories to reect their health level. Thus, self-reported
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health status is coded as an ordinal variable and survey responses for each country is given
below. We note that framing of scales are di¤erent across countries:
SRHTurkeyi =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1 if individual reports "Very bad"
2 if individual reports "Bad"
3 if individual reports "Not bad"
4 if individual reports "Good"
5 if individual reports "Very good"
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
SRHUSAi =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1 if individual reports "Poor"
2 if individual reports "Fair"
3 if individual reports "Good"
4 if individual reports "Very Good"
5 if individual reports "Excellent"
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
We have data for only certain age categories in the Turkish survey. We use a dummy
variable for each age category in estimations for Turkey. We construct a dummy variable for
females. Similarly, we have a dummy variable for those who are married. The unmarried
category includes single, divorced, widowed and separated individuals. We also construct
dummy variables for race in the U.S. data. We have data on ve levels of education for
Turkish respondents. "Illiterate" refers to respondents with no o¢ cial education. Individ-
uals who started primary school, but left without a diploma are included in "incomplete
basic." "Primary school", "secondary school" and "high school" graduates are reected by
dummy variables in regressions. Finally, we have respondents with "tertiary" education with
no further classication. For American households, we have data on years of education and
we also classify education levels. "Illiterate" refers to respondents with no o¢ cial education
or attendants of kindergarten. Individuals who had education less than high school, i.e. less
than nine years, are included in "high school (-)." "College," "associate" and "high school"
graduates are reected by dummy variables in estimations. College drop outs are repre-
sented by "college (-)." Finally, we have respondents with "tertiary" and "graduate" school
education. The chronic illness dummy reects an individual who has chronic condition(s).
The own-house dummy variable is equal to one if an individual is living in a family owned
house and equal to zero, otherwise. The house size measures utilized area of the house in
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which a respondent lives and family size indicates the number of individuals living in the
household. The family income corresponds to the sum of annual income of all individuals
in the same household represented in Turkish Liras and U.S. dollars. Finally, the number
of children living in a household, in which the respondent also lives, is reported for both
surveys.
Descriptive statistics for Turkey are provided in Table 9. In the Turkish data, we con-
sider individuals older than age of 14 for our sample including 30,104 respondents. Females
constitute 52.6% of total sample and 68.1% of respondents is married. The estimated mean
age of the sample is 39.2. 41% of males and 38.1% of females completed primary school
education. However, 24.4% of females are illiterate compared to 5.6% of male respondents.
50% of all respondents reported goodhealth level whereas 14.9% reported badhealth
level. The average subjective health status of men is 3.62 compared to that of women at
3.42. Moreover, 30.4% of the sample reports chronic illnesses. 61.7% of males work full time
whereas 55.2% of women do housework. Only 26.43% of females have a job, which is in line
with labor force participation rate of women in Turkey. According to Turkish Statistical
Institute, female labor force participation rate was 26% in 2006 and 30.2 % during May of
20127. Thus, there is a multicollinearity problem between employment status and the female
dummy since more than half of the females do housework in the Turkish sample. Moreover,
many respondents are not in the labor force of the country and we include 55.05% of total
sample in "not employed" category. Thus, we do not include employment level data in es-
timations to avoid severe multicollinearity. The average annual household income for this
sample is 8,146 Turkish Liras. The mean of utilized area for an household is 99.4 m2 and
68.9 % of all respondents live in a family-owned house. Finally, 43.1% of all respondents do
not have children whereas 23.6% have only one child.
Descriptive statistics for the United States are provided in Table 10. We consider indi-
viduals older than age of 14 in our sample, which is a total of 80,766 respondents. Females
constitute 52.34% of total sample and 50.27% of the sample is married. The mean age in this
sample is 43.81 and 75.53% of the total sample report their race as white. 26.51% of males
and 25.03% of females completed a high school level education. However, 18.61% of females
7http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=10878
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hold an associate degree compared to 17.2% of male respondents. 15.34% of the sample has
a college diploma whereas 8.31% hold a graduate degree. 29.2% of all respondents reported
excellenthealth condition; however, women report lower health status on average. Namely,
the average health status of men is 3.76 whereas that of women is 3.68. Moreover, 14.38% of
all sample report chronic illnesses. 65.73% of males are employed whereas 56.07% of women
do have a job which is in line with labor force participation rates in the U.S.8 The average
annual family income for the sample is $61,860. The mean household size is 3.12 and 64.45
% of all respondents live in a family owned house. Finally, 55.88% of all respondents do not
have children whereas 17.69% have only one child.
2.4 ESTIMATION RESULTS
We estimate ordered logit models for both countries to quantify the relationship between self-
reported health status, demographics and socioeconomic variables. Estimated coe¢ cients of
and magnitude of the gender di¤erence in self-reported health would not be correctly specied
in an ordinary least squares regression. As one may anticipate, self-assessed health outcomes
are at best ordered outcomes with no cardinal ranking. Therefore, modeling should be done
via an ordered choice model. Thus, we both present ordered logit and generalized ordered
logit estimations. The following equation represents our regression specication:
SRH i= 0+X i+"i
where SRH i is an individuals self-reported health status,  is vector of coe¢ cients
for explanatory variables, Xi is vector of socioeconomic and demographic variables for an
individual and "i is the error term.
Table 11 and Table 12 report ordered logit results of self-reported health status for
Turkey and the United States, respectively. Initial models estimate the relationship between
self-rated health level, demographics and socioeconomic variables. Then, we include control
variable for chronic conditions in the second specication. Finally, we add interaction terms
and provide estimates to test the di¤erential vulnerability hypothesis. For both countries,
8According to World Bank data, female labor force participation rate was 58% whereas male labor force
participation rate was 70% in 2010. Total labor force participation rate of the U.S. was 65% in 2010.
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Turkey: 2006
All Male Female
N % N % N %
Mean Mean Mean
Female 15,835 52.60
Married* 20,514 68.14 10,077 70.62 10,437 65.91
Age
Ages 15-19 3,826 12.71 1,802 12.63 2,024 12.78
Ages 20-24 3,193 10.61 1,414 9.91 1,779 11.23
Ages 25-29 3,090 10.26 1,479 10.37 1,611 10.17
Ages 30-34 3,124 10.38 1,447 10.35 1,647 10.4
Ages 35-39 2,851 9.47 1,346 9.43 1,505 9.5
Ages 40-44 2,929 9.73 1,448 10.15 1,481 9.35
Ages 45-49 2,518 8.36 1,220 8.55 1,298 8.2
Ages 50-54 2,209 7.34 1,114 7.81 1,095 6.92
Ages 55-59 1,793 5.96 843 5.91 950 6
Ages 60-64 1,415 4.7 681 4.77 734 4.64
Ages 65+ 3,156 10.48 1,445 10.13 1,711 10.81
Education
Illiterate 4,667 15.5 803 5.63 3,864 24.4
Incomplete 2,520 8.37 1,048 7.34 1,472 9.30
Primary 11,892 39.5 5,853 41.02 6,039 38.14
Secondary 4,371 14.52 2,619 18.35 1,752 11.06
High School 4,742 15.75 2,744 19.23 1,998 12.61
Tertiary 1,912 6.35 1,202 8.42 710 4.48
Health Status 30,104 3.52 14,269 3.62 15,835 3.42
(0.94) (0.90) (0.96)
Very good 3,230 10.73 1,783 12.5 1,447 9.14
Good 15,065 50.04 7,609 53.33 7,456 47.09
Not bad 6,676 22.18 2,953 20.7 3,723 23.51
Bad 4,500 14.95 1,662 11.65 2,838 17.92
Very Bad 633 2.1 262 1.84 371 2.34
Chronic Illness 9,180 30.49 3,634 25.47 5,546 35.02
Employment
Employed 13,531 44.95 9,346 65.5 4,185 26.43
Not Employed 16,573 55.05 4,923 34.5 11,650 73.57
Ownhouse 20,755 68.94 9,793 68.63 10,962 69.23
House Size (m2) 30,104 99.42 14,269 99.58 15,835 99.27
(30.53) (30.28) (30.75)
Family Income** 30,104 8.146 14,269 8.504 15,835 7.823
(10.897) (11.003) (10.791)
# of Children 30,104 1.19 14,269 1.17 15,835 1.22
(1.48) (1.45) (1.51)
0 12,987 43.14 6,214 43.55 6,773 42.77
1 7,121 23.65 3,398 23.81 3,723 23.51
2+ 9,996 33.21 4,657 32.64 5,339 33.62
1) * Single, widowed, divorced and other categories of marital status are coded as "unmarried."
2) ** Family income is represented in thousands of Turkish Liras.
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for United States: 2011
All Male Female
N % N % N %
Mean Mean Mean
Female 42,275 52.34
Married* 40,479 50.27 20,208 52.63 20,271 48.12
Age 80,766 43.81 38,491 43.04 42,275 44.51
(18.73) (18.52) (18.89)
Race
White 61,002 75.53 29,511 76.67 31,491 74.49
Black 12,394 15.35 5,478 14.23 6,916 16.36
Asian 6,113 7.57 2,869 7.45 3,244 7.67
Other 1,257 1.56 633 1.64 624 1.48
Education** 79,383 14.22 37,813 14.14 41,570 14.30
(3.69) ( 3.73) (3.65)
Illiterate 470 0.59 204 0.54 266 0.64
High School(-) 17,819 22.45 8,907 23.56 8,912 21.44
High School 20,430 25.74 10,023 26.51 10,407 25.03
Associate 14,239 17.94 6,504 17.20 7,735 18.61
College(-) 7,649 9.64 3,297 8.72 4,352 10.47
College 12,178 15.34 5,615 14.85 6,563 15.79
Graduate 6,598 8.31 3,263 8.63 3,335 8.02
Health Status 80,766 3.72 38,491 3.76 42,275 3.68
(1.07) (1.07) (1.08)
Excellent 23,582 29.20 11,867 30.83 11,715 27.71
Very good 24,473 30.30 11,584 30.10 12,889 30.49
Good 22,143 27.42 10,351 26.89 11,792 27.89
Fair 8,140 10.08 3,605 9.37 4,535 10.73
Poor 2,428 3.01 1,084 2.82 1,344 3.18
Chronic Illness 11,566 14.38 5,187 13.53 6,379 15.16
Employment
Employed 49,003 60.67 25,301 65.73 23,702 56.07
Not employed 31,763 39.33 13,190 34.27 18,573 43.93
Ownhouse 51,218 64.45 24,764 65.37 26,454 63.61
Family size 80,766 3.12 38,491 3.13 42,275 3.10
(1.71) (1.73) (1.70)
Family Income*** 80,766 61.86 38,491 64.11 42,275 59.81
(48.53) (48.81) (48.19)
# of Children 80,766 0.86 38,491 0.83 42,275 0.89
(1.21) (1.20) (1.22)
0 45,136 55.88 22,209 57.70 22,927 54.23
1 14,290 17.69 6,499 16.88 7,791 18.43
2+ 21,340 26.43 9,783 25.42 11,557 27.34
1) * Single, widowed, divorced and other categories in marital status and coded as "unmarried."
2) ** (-) Indicates incomplete education of the corresponding level.
3) *** Family income is represented in thousands of dollars.
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we observe a signicantly negative coe¢ cient for the female dummy in regressions without
interaction terms, in line with the literature. Age level coe¢ cients are signicantly negative
in all regressions for both countries. The higher the age level, the lower the reported health
status by Turkish and American respondents. Regression results for both data sets provide
evidence on a positive correlation between self-reported health and education level. The
more educated someone is, the more likely she/he is to report higher health status in Turkey
and United States. However, interactions of education levels with the female dummy variable
indicate di¤erent results across countries. In Turkey, there is a signicant gender di¤erence in
the impact of education on self-rated health status; females are less responsive to education
than males. Such di¤erences do not exist in the United States since there are no signicant
interaction terms for female and education level dummies according to Table 12. Estimation
results provide evidence that the self-reported health level is signicantly increasing in family
income of a respondent in both data sets. There is a signicantly positive relationship
between an individuals subjective health level and living in a family owned house. Moreover,
living in a larger house is associated with reporting signicantly higher health status in
Turkey. Clearly, household income, owning a house and living in a larger house are all
correlated with each other. Thus, we cannot make any causal inference based on ordered
logit results. Estimation results report a positive relationship between self-assessed health
level and the number of children in a household in the United States. A mechanism that may
explain this result is the reverse causality: i.e. healthier people may have and raise more
children. Moreover, results indicate that married people report signicantly higher health
status compared to unmarried people in Turkey whereas the United States data indicate a
negative correlation. Multicollinearity between income, education, age and marriage may
lead to this contrast across the two countries. The United States data indicate a consistent
gap in self-reported health status across races. African-Americans and other ethnic groups
except Asians report lower health status than Caucasions.
For both countries, we observe a negatively signicant coe¢ cient for the female dummy in
regressions without interaction terms. This is challenging evidence for the di¤erential expo-
sure hypothesis since controlling for socioeconomic conditions does not completely eliminate
the gender gap in self-assessed health status. Thus, we can state that the di¤erential ex-
42
posure by itself is not su¢ cient enough to explain gender di¤erences in self-reported health
status for Turkish and American household survey respondents. Unlike the previous litera-
ture (see Case and Paxson (2005) (21); Malmusi et al. (2012)(83)), controlling for chronic
conditions do not eliminate gender di¤erences for both countries.
One needs to be cautious about making quantitative interpretations from Tables 11 and
12 since estimated coe¢ cients of logit models are not reporting marginal e¤ects. We present
marginal e¤ects for the ordered logit models, controlling for chronic conditions without
interaction terms, in Tables 13 and 14. We observe that females are more likely to report
lower levels of health status and are less likely to report high levels of health status in
both countries. Compared to the reference group, i.e., individuals in the age group of 15-
19, the older the respondent is, the more likely she/he is to report lower health statuses
in Turkey. The United States data also reveals signicantly negative correlation between
age level and subjective health status of a respondent. The probability of reporting high
levels of subjective health status is increasing in education levels in both countries. However,
in the United States, there is no signicant di¤erence in the self-reported health levels of
respondents with less than a high school education and individuals without any o¢ cial
education. Individuals living in a family owned house are more likely to report higher levels
of health status in both countries. Living in a larger house is associated with reporting
higher self-rated health status for Turkish individuals. Being married positively impacts
the probability of reporting the highest health status and negatively impacts probability of
reporting the lowest health status in Turkey. Married Americans are less likely to report
high subjective health status. Turkish and American respondents with higher family income
levels are more likely to report higher health status. Finally, having a chronic illness has
a signicantly negative e¤ect on the probability of reporting higher levels of health status
for both countries. Marginal e¤ects reported by ordered logit models provide similar results
across the countries, although there are di¤erences in magnitudes. The estimated e¤ects
of socioeconomic and demographic variables on health status are mostly consistent with
previous ndings in the literature. These results extend generalizability of previous ndings
by providing additional evidence from a developing country data and recent data from a
developed country.
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Table 11: Ordered Logit Estimations for Turkey
Logit Models
[1] [2] [3]
Female -0.265*** -0.0978*** 0.427***
[0.0239] [0.0250] [0.145]
Ages 20-24 -0.432*** -0.407*** -0.261***
[0.0526] [0.0541] [0.0790]
Ages 25-29 -0.813*** -0.702*** -0.611***
[0.0572] [0.0590] [0.0884]
Ages 30-34 -1.176*** -0.953*** -0.803***
[0.0593] [0.0612] [0.0951]
Ages 35-39 -1.535*** -1.185*** -0.990***
[0.0605] [0.0628] [0.0989]
Ages 40-44 -1.765*** -1.348*** -1.150***
[0.0604] [0.0628] [0.0983]
Ages 45-49 -2.060*** -1.474*** -1.247***
[0.0628] [0.0656] [0.103]
Ages 50-54 -2.338*** -1.586*** -1.401***
[0.0647] [0.0678] [0.106]
Ages 55-59 -2.539*** -1.691*** -1.504***
[0.0674] [0.0708] [0.112]
Ages 60-64 -2.695*** -1.664*** -1.385***
[0.0710] [0.0748] [0.103]
Ages 65+ -3.101*** -2.020*** -1.758***
[0.0608] [0.06401] [0.0659]
Incomplete 0.425*** 0.418*** 0.535***
[0.0482] [0.0503] [0.0949]
Primary 0.713*** 0.636*** 0.846***
[0.0370] [0.0387] [0.0797]
Secondary 0.946*** 0.851*** 1.100***
[0.0506] [0.0527] [0.0913]
High 1.089*** 0.982*** 1.236***
[0.0482] [0.0503] [0.0901]
Tertiary 1.541*** 1.434*** 1.616***
[0.0610] [0.0634] [0.101]
Ownhouse 0.122*** 0.0811*** 0.0676*
[0.0255] [0.0266] [0.0394]
House Size [m2] 0.00336*** 0.00408*** 0.00438***
[0.000396] [0.000409] [0.000604]
Family Income 0.0138*** 0.00880*** 0.0106***
[0.00116] [0.00118] [0.00171]
Married 0.177*** 0.174*** 0.161***
[0.0317] [0.0331] [0.0613]
# of Children 0.0129 0.00228 -0.0118
[0.00861] [0.00893] [0.0135]
Chronic Illness -2.731*** -2.853***
[0.0326] [0.0452]
Female x Ownhouse 0.0252
[0.0536]
Female x House Size -0.00050
[0.000819]
Female x Family Income -0.00325
[0.00236]
Female x Married 0.00410
[0.0738]
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Table 11: continued
Logit Models
[1] [2] [3]
Female x # of Children 0.0217
[0.0182]
Female x Chronic Illness 0.226***
[0.0563]
Female x Ages 20-24 -0.284***
[0.109]
Female x Ages 25-29 -0.181
[0.120]
Female x Ages 30-34 -0.287**
[0.126]
Female x Ages 35-39 -0.367***
[0.129]
Female x Ages 40-44 -0.386***
[0.129]
Female x Ages 45-49 -0.440***
[0.134]
Female x Ages 50-54 -0.376***
[0.139]
Female x Ages 55-59 -0.383***
[0.145]
Female x Ages 60-64 -0.544***
[0.153]
Female x Ages 65+ -0.491***
[0.132]
Female x Incomplete -0.117
[0.113]
Female x Primary -0.264***
[0.0920]
Female x Secondary -0.355***
[0.116]
Female x High -0.371***
[0.111]
Female x Tertiary -0.221
[0.137]
cut1 -4.821*** -6.038*** -5.699***
[0.0799] [0.0844] [0.121]
cut2 -2.300*** -3.235*** -2.895***
[0.0712] [0.0758] [0.115]
cut3 -0.811*** -1.200*** -0.858***
[0.0704] [0.0732] [0.114]
cut4 2.359*** 2.339*** 2.681***
[0.0703] [0.0729] [0.1114]
N 30,104 30,104 30,104
1) Ages 15-19 is the reference group for age.
2) Illiterate are reference groups for age and education levels.
3) Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: Ordered Logit Estimations for the United States
Ordered Logit Models
[1] [2] [3]
Female -0.0775*** -0.0802*** -0.557***
[0.0133] [0.134] [0.191]
Married 0.0179 -0.135*** -0.101***
[0.0151] [0.0154] [0.0236]
Age -0.0377*** -0.0280*** -0.0325***
[0.000446] [0.000461] [0.000705]
Black -0.260*** -0.252*** -0.165***
[0.0189] [0.0190] [0.0284]
Asian -0.0309 -0.105*** -0.0917**
[0.0256] [0.0258] [0.0377]
Other Race -0.298*** -0.281*** -0.322***
[0.0527] [0.0534] [0.0757]
High School(-) 0.195** 0.0107 -0.0216
[0.0888] [0.0901] [0.139]
High School 0.403*** 0.224** 0.0741
[0.0886] [0.0899] [0.139]
College(-) 0.573*** 0.400*** 0.275**
[0.0892] [0.0905] [0.140]
Associate 0.648*** 0.442*** 0.336**
[0.0904] [0.0917] [0.142]
College 0.874*** 0.643*** 0.528***
[0.0898] [0.0911] [0.140]
Graduate 0.998*** 0.753*** 0.696***
[0.0915] [0.0927] [0.143]
Ownhouse 0.247*** 0.225*** 0.197***
[0.0157] [0.0158] [0.0230]
Family Size -0.155*** -0.165*** -0.142***
[0.00700] [0.00710] [0.0101]
Family Income 0.00834*** 0.00728*** 0.00681***
[0.000172] [0.000173] [0.000247]
# of Children 0.155*** 0.151*** 0.137***
[0.00959] [0.00969] [0.0142]
Chronic Illness -2.076*** -2.036***
[0.0227] [0.0320]
[0.186]
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Table 12: continued
Ordered Logit Models
[1] [2] [3]
Female x Married -0.0328
[0.0313]
Female x Age 0.00790***
[0.000926]
Female x Black -0.152***
[0.0383]
Female x Asian -0.0358
[0.0517]
Female x Other Race 0.0801
[0.107]
Female x High School(-) 0.216
[0.183]
Female x High School 0.258
[0.182]
Female x College(-) 0.224
[0.184]
Female x Associate 0.191
[0.186]
Female x College 0.212
[0.185]
Female x Graduate 0.112
[0.188]
Female x Ownhouse 0.0468
[0.0317]
Female x Family Size -0.0469***
[0.0142]
Female x Family Income 0.000899***
[0.000344]
Female x # of Children 0.0312
[0.0195]
Female x Chronic Illness -0.0825**
[0.0419]
cut1 -4.722*** -5.393*** -5.666***
[0.0955] [0.0977] [0.146]
cut2 -3.020*** -3.458*** -3.729***
[0.0938] [0.0954] [0.145]
cut3 -1.295*** -1.490*** -1.757***
[0.0932] [0.0946] [0.144]
cut4 0.174* 0.0390 -0.226
[0.0931] [0.0944] [0.144]
N 78,183 77,865 77,865
1) White is the base group for race.
2) Education reference groups is "No Education."
3) Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Family roles and how women cope with them may a¤ect subjective assessment of health
status di¤erently for men and women. Denton and Walters (1999)(34) found that socioeco-
nomic factors such as having a high income, working full time, caring for family are more
important in predicting good health among women rather than men. In order to test the
di¤erential vulnerability hypothesis, we introduce interaction terms in the regressions. Ac-
cording to Tables 11 and 12, interaction terms for education and gender are signicantly
negative for Turkey. Thus, female and male groups have signicantly di¤erent coe¢ cients
for education levels in Turkey. However, there is no signicant di¤erence in education level
coe¢ cients of males and females in the American survey. There are signicant gender dif-
ferences in educational attainment in Turkey, which would be the initial driving source of
these results. As a developed country, the United States does not exhibit large gender dif-
ferences in early education levels. Similarly, there are signicant di¤erences in coe¢ cients
for interactions of age level dummies with female dummy in both countries. Similarly, fe-
male and male populations react signicantly di¤erently to chronic conditions. Coe¢ cients
of other interaction terms such as household income, marital status, household size, house
ownership and race reveal mixed results across the countries. Unlike the United States data,
negative coe¢ cients for female dummies disappear and become positive as we include inter-
actions into the models with Turkish data. Overall, these results provide partial supporting
evidence for the di¤erential vulnerability hypothesis since women react di¤erently to same
environmental life events. However, gender di¤erences in the self-reported health status are
not fully explained by the di¤erential vulnerability and the di¤erential exposure hypotheses
for Turkey and the U.S.
The ordered logit model assumes that the reaction of males and females to same question
do not di¤er in their perception of health. Therefore, we need to test this assumption to
receive robust ndings. In this respect, we estimate a generalized ordered logit to reveal the
e¤ect of being female on di¤erent margins of reporting health status. Generalized ordered
logit model (1) estimates are reported in Tables 15 and 16, with marginal e¤ects in Tables
17 and 18. In a generalized ordered logit (1), coe¢ cients of socioeconomic and demographic
variables are allowed to di¤er across alternative levels of sujbective health status. This model,
as it stands, is potentially inconsistent, though it can still be estimated. It provides an initial
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Table 13: Marginal E¤ects for Turkey: Ordered Logit
Self Reported Health Very Bad (1) Bad (2) Not Bad (3) Good (4) Very Good (5)
Probability 0.00460 0.06630 0.29766 0.58404 0.04738
Female 0.00044 0.00598 0.01631 -0.01832 -0.00442
Ages 20-24 0.00220 0.02866 0.06713 -0.08203 -0.01597
Ages 25-29 0.00432 0.05468 0.11185 -0.14593 -0.02492
Ages 30-34 0.00657 0.08075 0.14499 -0.20101 -0.03131
Ages 35-39 0.00923 0.10937 0.16912 -0.25174 -0.03599
Ages 40-44 0.01134 0.13088 0.18266 -0.28574 -0.03915
Ages 45-49 0.01346 0.15081 0.18784 -0.31159 -0.04054
Ages 50-54 0.01561 0.16985 0.18986 -0.33372 -0.04160
Ages 55-59 0.01803 0.18984 0.18784 -0.35361 -0.04210
Ages 60-64 0.01784 0.18778 0.18413 -0.34880 -0.04096
Ages 65+ 0.02372 0.23577 0.20042 -0.41010 -0.04982
Incomplete -0.00162 -0.02215 -0.06826 0.06988 0.02215
Primary -0.00277 -0.03722 -0.10448 0.11360 0.03088
Secondary -0.00297 -0.04095 -0.13386 0.12655 0.05123
High -0.00335 -0.04615 -0.15241 0.14065 0.06127
Tertiary -0.00383 -0.05576 -0.20010 0.14117 0.11653
Ownhouse -0.00037 -0.000504 -0.01354 0.01534 0.00361
House Size [m2] -0.00001 -0.00025 -0.00068 0.00076 0.00018
Family Income -0.00004 -0.00053 -0.00146 0.00165 0.00039
Married -0.00082 -0.01093 -0.02894 0.03308 0.00762
# of Children* -0.00001 -0.00013 -0.00038 0.00042 0.00010
Chronic Illness 0.02794 0.27737 0.28794 -0.49802 -0.09524
1) *All but the e¤ect of number of children is signicant at the 1% level
2) Ordered Logit Model [2] of Table 11 is the base for estimated e¤ects.
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Table 14: Marginal E¤ects for United States: Ordered Logit
Self Reported Health Poor (1) Fair (2) Good (3) Very Good (4) Excellent (5)
Probability 0.01364 0.07375 0.31941 0.35293 0.24024
Female 0.00107 0.00530 0.01295 -0.00469 -0.01464
Married 0.00181 0.00893 0.02174 -0.00790 -0.02459
Age 0.00037 0.00185 0.00452 -0.00164 -0.00511
Black 0.00370 0.01793 0.04003 -0.01775 -0.04392
Asian 0.00147 0.00719 0.01679 -0.00679 -0.01866
Other Race 0.00432 0.02073 0.04403 -0.02148 -0.04760
High School (-)* -0.00140 -0.00693 -0.01733 0.00584 0.01982
High School** -0.00285 -0.01420 -0.03624 0.01137 0.04193
College (-) -0.00478 -0.02399 -0.06486 0.01590 0.07773
Associate -0.00503 -0.02547 -0.07160 0.01422 0.08789
College -0.00707 -0.03587 -0.10321 0.01612 0.13004
Graduate -0.00762 -0.03909 -0.11945 0.00839 0.15777
Ownhouse -0.00312 -0.01529 -0.03603 0.01416 0.04028
Family Size 0.00221 0.01091 0.02659 -0.00967 -0.03004
Family Income -0.00009 -0.00048 -0.00117 0.00042 0.00132
# of Children -0.00202 -0.00999 -0.02435 0.00886 0.02751
Chronic Illness 0.06544 0.22974 0.16990 -0.21685 -0.24823
1) *All but the e¤ect of high school education is signicant at the 1% level. ** Signicant at 5% level.
2) Ordered Logit Model [2] of Table 12 is the base for estimated e¤ects.
50
insight on whether coe¢ cients for each alternative vary or not. The inspection of estimates
suggests that the coe¢ cients di¤er substantially across di¤erent self-assessed health levels in
both countries. A likelihood ratio test rejects the restricted model (ordered logit) at 99%
critical value for both Turkey and United States9. Therefore, the generalized logit model
mainly implies the need for taking heterogeneity in individual responses into account for the
analysis. These results lead us to elaborate on reporting heterogeneity, which potentially
may result in a biased support for the di¤erential vulnerability hypothesis.
Generalized versions of ordered probit model have a structure that allows for alternative
specic estimates of the latent equation (1) and the threshold parameters (2). As discussed
in Greene and Hensher (2010a)(51), it is possible to estimate a more elaborate model to
account for deciencies in the generalized ordered logit model (1). Next, we report results
from the generalized ordered probit model (2) where the threshold parameters are allowed
to depend on individual specic observed vectors. This hypothesis about the di¤erential
response to self reported health categories outlined in the current paper is tested by using
estimates from this model. Tables 19 and 20 report a model estimated via Hierarchical
Ordered Probit (HOPIT) for both countries. Threshold parameters depend on the gender
of the respondent in both countries and explanatory variables consist of demographics and
socioeconomic conditions. If there was no heterogeneity in anticipation of thresholds, then
the coe¢ cients of the explanatory terms would be insignicant in the estimated specication.
However, according to the HOPIT results, the coe¢ cient of the female dummy variable is
signicant at lower health categories for Turkish respondents; a negative value for the rst
threshold and a positive value for the second. Thus, a Turkish individual, being female,
anticipates a lower health condition when she reports SRH = 1 (very bad health) compared
to that of a male Turkish individual. Moreover, "bad" health conditions (SRH = 2) reported
by a female covers a much bigger range compared to that of a male in terms of underlying
health status for Turkish respondents. Estimations for the United States reveal di¤erent
results. The coe¢ cient on the female dummy is signicant for the highest threshold of
American respondents. Namely, for the American sample, the "very good" health condition
(SRH = 4) reported by a female covers a much bigger range as compared to an American
9Likelihood ratio tests report the following results: LRUSAchi2(51) = 1768:90 LR
Turkey
chi2(66) = 524:93
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Table 15: Generalized Ordered Logit Results for Turkey
Self Reported Health Very Bad (1) Bad (2) Not Bad (3) Good (4) Very Good (5)
Female 0.475*** 0.0633 -0.132*** -0.236***
[0.0919] [0.0415] [0.0335] [0.409]
Ages 20-24 -0.594* -0.293** -0.487*** -0.333***
[0.327] [0.135] [0.0858] [0.0675]
Ages 25-29 -0.703** -0.553*** -0.856*** -0.505***
[0.329] [0.133] [0.0878] [0.0791]
Ages 30-34 -0.672** -0.648*** -1.132*** -0.694***
[0.321] [0.128] [0.0876] [0.0879]
Ages 35-39 -0.607* -0.771*** -1.315*** -1.057***
[0.325] [0.127] [0.0886] [0.0987]
Ages 40-44 -0.613* -0.877*** -1.557*** -1.123***
[0.316] [0.124] [0.0882] [0.102]
Ages 45-49 -0.850*** -0.849*** -1.744*** -1.316***
[0.306] [0.126] [0.0914] [0.117]
Ages 50-54 -0.807*** -0.976*** -1.835*** -1.589***
[0.304] [0.125] [0.0946] [0.140]
Ages 55-59 -0.403 -1.102*** -2.023*** -1.559***
[0.313] [0.126] [0.0992] [0.162]
Ages 60-64 -0.294 -1.093*** -1.966*** -1.654***
[0.317] [0.128] [0.105] [0.208]
Ages 65+ -0.922*** -1.364*** -2.347*** -1.886***
[0.280] [0.117] [0.0934] [0.187]
Incomplete 0.579*** 0.442*** 0.291*** 0.323***
[0.136] [0.0666] [0.0678] [0.119]
Primary 0.908*** 0.760*** 0.558*** 0.290***
[0.109] [0.0513] [0.0511] [0.100]
Secondary 1.393*** 1.158*** 0.765*** 0.420***
[0.239] [0.0909] [0.0711] [0.107]
High 1.565*** 1.361*** 0.887*** 0.532***
[0.230] [0.0874] [0.0672] [0.107]
Tertiary 2.553*** 2.061*** 1.326*** 0.970***
[0.586] [0.148] [0.0892] [0.119]
Ownhouse -0.171 -0.0136 0.158*** 0.0531
[0.106] [0.0454] [0.0354] [0.0427]
House Size [m2] 0.00685*** 0.00431*** 0.00431*** 0.00314***
[0.00153] [0.00066] [0.00056] [0.00066]
Family Income 0.0160** 0.0139*** 0.0128*** 0.00595***
[0.00658] [0.00257] [0.00184] [0.00164]
Married 0.650*** 0.317*** 0.149*** 0.0119
[0.0951] [0.0502] [0.0460] [0.0588]
# of Children 0.0662** -0.0108 -0.0074 0.0153
[0.0323] [0.0140] [0.0117] [0.0149]
Chronic Illness -2.563*** -2.755*** -2.713*** -19.84
[0.139] [0.0459] [0.0367] [729.4]
Constant 4.015*** 2.448*** 1.401*** -1.775***
[0.333] [0.135] [0.103] [0.130]
N 30,104
1) Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 16: Generalized Ordered Logit Results for United States
Self Reported Health Poor (1) Fair (2) Good (3) Very Good (4) Excellent (5)
Female -0.0300 -0.0595** -0.0540*** -0.102***
[0.0457] [0.0246] [0.0162] [0.0167]
Married -0.240*** -0.159*** -0.0889*** -0.102***
[0.0499] [0.0272] [0.0185] [0.0199]
Age -0.0207*** -0.0272*** -0.0271*** -0.0291***
[0.00150] [0.00078] [0.00054] [0.00061]
Black 0.134** -0.376*** -0.288*** -0.150***
[0.0574] [0.0315] [0.0225] [0.0244]
Asian -0.0188 -0.00222 -0.153*** -0.113***
[0.106] [0.0539] [0.0313] [0.0313]
Other Race -0.00571 -0.170* -0.316*** -0.303***
[0.164] [0.0899] [0.0630] [0.0720]
High School (-) 0.0742 0.110 0.00269 0.0321
[0.177] [0.119] [0.109] [0.135]
High School 0.399** 0.356*** 0.144 -0.0238
[0.178] [0.119] [0.109] [0.135]
College (-) 0.571*** 0.552*** 0.356*** 0.113
[0.184] [0.121] [0.110] [0.136]
Associate 0.573*** 0.592*** 0.409*** 0.157
[0.193] [0.125] [0.111] [0.137]
College 0.822*** 0.870*** 0.654*** 0.359***
[0.196] [0.125] [0.111] [0.136]
Graduate 1.063*** 0.998*** 0.778*** 0.488***
[0.225] [0.134] [0.113] [0.138]
Ownhouse 0.187*** 0.333*** 0.217*** 0.144***
[0.0514] [0.0279] [0.0189] [0.0199]
Family Size -0.223*** -0.219*** -0.208*** -0.0946***
[0.0245] [0.0125] [0.00834] [0.00868]
Family Income 0.0112*** 0.00989*** 0.00811*** 0.00636***
[0.000861] [0.000403] [0.000222] [0.000202]
# of Children 0.238*** 0.222*** 0.170*** 0.0949***
[0.0377] [0.0183] [0.0115] [0.0117]
Chronic Illness -3.138*** -2.224*** -1.731*** -1.663***
[0.0613] [0.0271] [0.0275] [0.0441]
Constant 5.640*** 3.357*** 1.552*** 0.157
[0.213] [0.131] [0.114] [0.139]
N 77,865 77,865 77,865 77,865
1) Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 17: Marginal E¤ects for Turkey: Generalized Ordered Logit
SRH Very Bad (1) Bad (2) Not Bad (3) Good (4) Very Good (5)
Probability 0.00588 0.06921 0.29161 0.63299 0.00029
Female -0.00283*** -0.00156 0.03490*** -0.03043* -0.000069
Ages 20-24 0.00444 0.01805* 0.09499*** -0.11739*** -0.000085
Ages 25-29 0.00552 0.04087*** 0.16220*** -0.20848*** -0.000121
Ages 30-34 0.00520 0.05098*** 0.21899*** -0.27502*** -0.000156
Ages 35-39 0.00459 0.06550*** 0.24724*** -0.31713*** -0.000210
Ages 40-44 0.00464 0.07799*** 0.28750*** -0.36991*** -0.000219
Ages 45-49 0.00725** 0.07264*** 0.32770*** -0.40737*** -0.000238
Ages 50-54 0.00679* 0.08998*** 0.32743*** -0.42395*** -0.000260
Ages 55-59 0.00282 0.11277*** 0.34036*** -0.45571*** -0.000252
Ages 60-64 0.00196 0.11343*** 0.32940*** -0.44455*** -0.000254
Ages 65+ 0.00798** 0.14210*** 0.36381*** -0.51361*** -0.000301
Incomplete -0.00270*** -0.02363*** -0.03869*** 0.06492** 0.000108
Primary -0.00499*** -0.04504*** -0.07674*** 0.12670*** 0.000087
Secondary -0.00539*** -0.05294*** -0.10310*** 0.16130*** 0.000143
High -0.00593*** -0.06032*** -0.11819*** 0.18426*** 0.000188
Tertiary -0.00636*** -0.06669*** -0.17006*** 0.24268** 0.000448
Ownhouse 0.00097* -0.00003 -0.03786*** 0.03690*** 0.000015
House Size [m2] -0.00004*** -0.00025*** -0.00070*** 0.00100*** 0.0000009
Family Income -0.00009** -0.00087*** -0.00199*** 0.00296*** 0.0000017
Married -0.00434*** -0.01879*** -0.01172 0.03485*** 0.0000034
# of Children -0.00038** 0.00113 0.00096 -0.00172 0.0000044
Chronic Illness 0.03124*** 0.29023*** 0.26883*** -0.48031*** -0.109999***
1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 18: Marginal E¤ects for United States: Generalized Ordered Logit
SRH Poor (1) Fair (2) Good (3) Very Good (4) Excellent (5)
Probability 0.00709 0.06846 0.31813 0.35454 0.25175
Female 0.000211 0.00394** 0.00873** 0.00639* -0.0193***
Married 0.00169*** 0.00943*** 0.0101** -0.00193 -0.0193***
Age 0.000146*** 0.00175*** 0.00458*** -0.000991 -0.00549***
Black 0.000987** 0.0284*** 0.0406*** -0.0425*** -0.0276***
Asian 0.000134 0.000021 0.0369*** -0.0163** -0.0207***
Other Race 0.000040 0.0127* 0.0645*** -0.0245* -0.0528***
High School (-) -0.000512 -0.00698 0.00685 -0.00544 0.00608
High School -0.00257** -0.0206*** -0.0110 0.0386 -0.00447
College (-) -0.00340*** -0.0300*** -0.0492** 0.0609** 0.0216
Associate -0.00325*** -0.0307*** -0.0595*** 0.0629** 0.0305
College -0.00449*** -0.0433*** -0.0983*** 0.0743*** 0.0717**
Graduate -0.00506*** -0.0448*** -0.118*** 0.0673** 0.101***
Ownhouse -0.00135*** -0.0229*** -0.0278*** 0.0252*** 0.0269***
Family Size 0.00157*** 0.0137*** 0.0343*** -0.0318*** -0.0178***
Family Income -0.00007*** -0.000612*** -0.00124*** 0.000736*** 0.00120***
# of Children -0.00167*** -0.0138*** -0.0250*** 0.0226*** 0.0179***
Chronic Illness 0.0903*** 0.208*** 0.107*** -0.180*** -0.225***
1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 19: Hierarchical Ordered Probit Results for Turkey
Self Reported Health Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 3 Cut 4
Female -0.1554*** 0.1355*** 0.0306 0.0114
[0.0402] [0.0277] [0.0205] [0.0126]
Age -0.0200***
[0.0006]
Education Level 0.1378***
[0.0058]
Family Income 0.0045***
[0.0007]
Ownhouse 0.0625***
[0.0147]
Married 0.0364**
[0.0158]
# of Children -0.0027
[0.0048]
House Size 0.0024***
[0.0002]
Chronic Illness -1.5559***
[0.0175]
Constant -3.3413*** 0.3359*** 0.0955*** 0.7120***
[0.0508] [0.0224] [0.0160] [0.0092]
N 30,104 30,104 30,104 30,104 30,104
1) Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
male in terms of underlying a "true" health status. Thus, evidence from both countries
indicates that reporting thresholds for subjective health statuses are signicantly di¤erent
across genders.
2.5 CONCLUSION
Frequently documented gender di¤erences in health outcomes are thought to arise from
biological factors, socioeconomic factors and probably from the interaction of both. Most
studies reporting results from North America and Europe neglect developing countries. In
an e¤ort to ll this gap and test the generalizability of previous ndings, we present health
survey data from a developing country, Turkey, as well as from a developed country, the
United States. We extend the literature by introducing evidence from a cross-country data
set to analyze determinants of gender di¤erences in self-assessed health status. However,
di¤erences in the framing of the scales of survey questions prevent a direct comparison of
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Table 20: Hierarchical Ordered Probit Results for United States
Self Reported Health Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 3 Cut 4
Female 0.0019 0.0322 -0.0057 0.0348***
[0.0221] [0.0209] [0.0119] [0.0112]
Married -0.1092***
[0.0088]
Age -0.0150***
[0.0003]
Education Level 0.0367***
[0.0012]
Black -0.1595***
[0.0111]
Asian -0.0745***
[0.0151]
Other Race -0.1849***
[0.0311]
Ownhouse 0.0954***
[0.0092]
Family Income 0.0041***
[0.0001]
# of Children -0.0058
[0.0036]
Chronic Illness -1.1640***
[0.0123]
Constant -2.4807*** 0.0192 0.1093*** -0.1042***
[0.0259] [0.0158] [0.0088] [0.0082]
N 77,865 77,865 77,865 77,865 77,865
1) Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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results across countries.
This study provides tests of alternative explanations for the gender gap in self-rated
health status: 1) the "di¤erential exposure" hypothesis, 2) the "di¤erential vulnerability"
hypothesis, 3) heterogeneity in reporting thresholds. We estimate ordered choice models
to quantify social factors that prove important in self-reported health outcomes. Results
indicate signicant gender di¤erences in self-reported health levels. The direction of the
relationship between socioeconomic status indicators and self-assessed health statuses are
mostly consistent with the literature. However, unlike previous results, we nd signicant
gender di¤erences even with the controls of chronic illnesses. We also report that the dif-
ferential vulnerability and the di¤erential exposure hypotheses can partially explain gender
di¤erences in self-assessed health outcomes but they are not su¢ cient to account for a full
explanation of the gap. Thus, there remains a signicant gender gap in self-rated health
status, which is not explained by chronic illness conditions or social factors. Moreover, by
employing a generalized ordered logit model and a hierarchical ordered probit model, we
show that reporting cut-o¤s for subjective health status signicantly varies across genders.
Results of the current study provide additional evidence that males and females report
signicantly di¤erent subjective health levels. Our ndings suggest that the gender gap is
driven by additional mechanisms other than "di¤erential exposure," "di¤erential vulnerabil-
ity" and chronic conditions. One such factor is the reporting di¤erences between men and
women in both countries. Heterogeneity in anticipation of a current objective health may
lead to di¤erent values attached to objective health outcomes. Namely, both Turkish and
American females use di¤erent thresholds than their male counterparts in reporting their
subjective health status. Moreover, there are cross-country di¤erences in female reporting
behavior. While Turkish females use a larger range for reporting SRH=2, American females
have a higher cut-o¤ point for reporting SRH=4. Reporting heterogeneity in thresholds
leads us to further investigate the issue, possibly, with a theoretical model. Thus, a fur-
ther analysis of gender di¤erences in self-assessed health status is necessary to identify all
accounting factors of the gap. In a complementary study, we propose a theoretical model
to explain gender di¤erences in self-reported health status and hypothesize that the gender
gap in health status is driven also by heterogeneity in individual discount rates.
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3.0 DOES HETEROGENEITY IN INDIVIDUAL DISCOUNT RATES
EXPLAIN THE GENDER GAP IN SELF-ASSESSED HEALTH STATUS?
Co-authored with Mehmet Ali Soytas
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Health outcomes signicantly di¤er across genders. The literature frequently documents
that females report signicantly worse self-assessed health statuses than males. Subjective
health statuses of survey respondents vary across socioeconomic conditions such as income,
education, race, age, etc. Gender di¤erences may arise from biological factors, socioeconomic
conditions or the interactions of both. A signicant gender gap in subjective health status
exists when di¤erent measures for demographics, socioeconomic variables and social mecha-
nisms are taken into account (Walters et al. (2002)(121); Denton et al. (2004)(35); Soytas
and Kose (2013)(110)). Soytas and Kose (2013)(110) indicated that there is still a signicant
gender gap in self-reported health statuses even after controlling for chronic illness conditions
unlike in previous studies (Case and Paxson (2005)(21); Malmusi et al. (2012)(83)). More-
over, there is evidence of reporting heterogeneity in self-assessed health statuses. Lindeboom
and van Doorslaer (2004)(81) showed that reporting thresholds of Canadian respondents are
signicantly a¤ected by gender and age whereas Soytas and Kose (2013)(110) reported that
Turkish and American females use di¤erent reporting cuto¤s than their male counterparts.
Although the previous literature o¤ers some explanations, there still remains a signicant
and unexplained gender gap in self-reported health statuses. Denton et al. (2004)(35)
asserted that models covering more health-related variables and a detailed investigation of
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the gender di¤erences in health would be valuable. In an e¤ort to ll this gap in the literature
and provide a more robust mechanism to explain the gender gap in self-reported health, we
present a theoretical model. In most health surveys, participants are asked to evaluate
their health on a 1-5 grade scale. The respondentsassessment of their health levels are
anticipated as a discrete measure, which is a proxy for their true health statuses. However,
this measure does not have to reect the current well-being of an individual. From the
economists point of view, we consider self-reported health status levels as a proxy for the
respondentsperception of the total utility derived from their health, which contains both
current and expected future health levels. We suggest that the current utility associated with
the current health state is the solution to a dynamic problem, which includes the discounted
sums of future utilities. This approach, theoretically, can produce di¤erent current valuation
functions for two individuals, who even may have the same level of unobserved true health
today. Therefore, a male and a female may actually report di¤erent discrete health statuses
depending on their valuation of the future, even if they have the same current objective,
unobserved true health.
We hypothesize that heterogeneity in individual discount rates would lead to reporting
heterogeneity in self-assessed health status. Then, the gender di¤erences in the valuation of
the future will help with explaining the gender gap in subjective health statuses. There is
evidence on gender di¤erences in subjective individual discount rates. Silverman (2003)(106)
concluded that women discount future rewards less than men. Similarly, Zimbardo et al.
(1997)(126) found that females are more future-oriented than males whereas men are more
present-oriented. Gender di¤erences in subjective discount rates could crucially a¤ect self-
reported health levels of individuals. Thus, we propose a dynamic theoretical model to
explain the gender di¤erences in self-reported health statuses and suggest that the gender
gap is driven also by heterogeneity in discount rates of future utility.
We use some data from the U.S. National Health Interview Survey of 2012 to test the
predictions of our model and theoretical identication. Following the previous literature, we
employ smoking habits as proxies for individual discount rates (Fuchs (1982)(47); Schar¤
and Viscusi (2011)(103); Peretti-Watel et al. (2013)(100)). We estimate the identication
parameters implied by the dynamic model and compare them with an ordered probit es-
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timation. Results indicate magnitude di¤erences across coe¢ cients of the ordered probit
and the structural model identication. We conclude that accounting for heterogeneity in
individual discount factors explains a substantial portion of the gender gap in self-assessed
health statuses. Thus, attempts to explain the gender gap in self-rated health statuses and
policy makers should take heterogeneity in individual discount rates into account.
Section two provides a brief discussion of the related literature. The third section de-
scribes theoretical models and identication equations. Following the data description, sec-
tion ve explains the estimation and results to highlight empirical outcomes that can t into
observed trend in the data. Section six concludes.
3.2 RELATED LITEATURE
Research, mostly based on survey data, revealed gender di¤erences in health outcomes.
There is a huge literature devoted to an explanation of the gender gap in subjective health
status. Biological factors, socioeconomic variables and demographics are frequently stated
as explanatory variables of the gap. Providing a review of the literature, Soytas and Kose
(2013)(110) showed that accounting for socioeconomic variables, demographics and chronic
conditions are not su¢ cient to explain gender di¤erences in self-assessed health statuses.
Using data sets from the United States and Turkey, the authors present evidence on gender
di¤erences in reporting behavior and concluded that reporting thresholds are a¤ected by
the gender of the respondent in both countries. We need to investigate the underlying
mechanisms for gender di¤erences in subjective assessments of health levels. This study
considers another factor: the subjective discount rate1, which may signicantly a¤ect the
behavior of individuals. Thus, we provide a review of studies on discounting factor and
health-related variables in this section.
Researchers showed that agents generally discount the value of a future rewards (con-
sumption, income, etc.) relative to the value of immediate rewards. There are many terms,
such as time preference, positive rate of intertemporal substitution and delay discounting, to
refer to this phenomenon (Chao et al. (2009) (23)). The degree of discounting the future
1We follow this term used by Chao et al. (2009) (23).
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may change across individuals depending on demographics and social factors2. For instance,
Coller and Williams (1999)(28) showed that individual discount rates are a¤ected by so-
cioeconomic characteristics and male participants have signicantly higher discount rates.
Moreover, researchers analyzed the relationship between discount rates, age, race, educa-
tion, income, household size, religious beliefs, the number of dependents, smoking, etc. (See
Lawrence (1991)(75); Coller and Williams (1999)(28); Carter et al. (2012)(19); Chabris
et al. (2008)(22); Harrison et al. (2002)(55); Eckel et al. (2005)(38); Waner and Pleeter
(2001)(122)).
The literature provides mixed evidence on gender di¤erences in subjective individual
discount rates3. Similar to Coller and Williams (1999)(28), Kirby and Marakovic (1996)(73)
reported higher discount rates for males. Moreover, Silverman (2003)(106) provided a meta-
analysis of 33 studies and stated that women discount future rewards less than men. How-
ever, the author noted that gender di¤erences are small and dependent on measurement
type. Zimbardo et al. (1997)(126) stated that females are more future-oriented than males
whereas men are more present-oriented. In contrast, studying a Netherlands sample, Van
Praag and Booij (2003)(116) revealed that women have higher discount rates than men.
On the other hand, Harrison et al. (2002)(55) estimated identical discount rates for men
and women whereas these rates are sensitive to sociodemographic variables such as age, in-
come, education and employment status. Warner and Pleeter (2001)(122) found no gender
di¤erences in discount rates of men and women by using a military personnel data.
Some studies discovered that smoking habits are correlated with individual discount rates
(Fuchs (1982)(47); Schar¤ and Viscusi (2011)(103); Peretti-Watel et al. (2013)(100)). Many
studies used smoking behavior as a proxy of individual discount factors. Considering smok-
ing habits as a predictor of discount factors, some researchers used smoking habits as an
instrument for education and labor market choices (see Evans and Montgomery (1994)(39);
Chevalier and Walker (2001)(26); Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer (2003)(43); Munasinghe and
Sicherman (2000)(88)). Providing a review of empirical studies on education and health,
Grossman (2006)(64) discussed the potential of time preferences as an omitted variable to
2Frederick et al. (2002)(45) gave a more extensive overview of the ndings on time discounting.
3Teuscher and Mitchell (2011)(113) provided an excellent review of studies on delay discounting.
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explain health outcomes. For instance, Fuchs (1982)(47) reported a negative, although not
signicant, relationship between subjective health statuses and discount factors of the indi-
viduals. Moreover, Van Der Pol (2011)(115) showed that controlling time preferences reduces
the e¤ect of education on self-assessed health statuses of Dutch populations. The author re-
ported a negatively-signicant coe¢ cient for a time preference measure. Moreover, Chao et
al. (2009)(23) provided evidence for the relationship between health measures and subjective
discount rates. The authors documented that physical health and survival probability has a
U-shaped relationship with subjective discount rates. Namely, individuals with very bad and
very good health levels have higher discount rates. Some studies indicated that individuals
with higher rates of time preference (and lower risk aversion (Ida and Odo (2009)(65)) are
more likely to smoke (Ida and Odo (2009)(65); Schar¤ and Viscusi (2011)(103))), whereas
Khwaja et al. (2007)(71) exihibited no signicant relationship between smoking and sub-
jective measures of time preference. Harrison et al. 2010(56) observed heterogeneity in the
discount rates of male smokers and non-smokers while the discount rates do not signicantly
di¤er in female populations. Leonard et al. (2013)(80) found that higher tolerance of risk
and more patience in time preferences are signicantly correlated with higher stages of phys-
ical activity in a low income African-American community. Obtaining u shots, drinking
behavior, BMI di¤erences in a specic year are also employed as proxies for individual dis-
count rates (Chapman and Coups (1999)(24); Borghans and Golsteyn (2006)(10); Vuchinich
(1998)(119)). Finally, Lawless et al. (2013)(76) provided a review of the relationship between
time preferences and health behaviours. The authors discussed the interaction between time
preferences and health concerns such as smoking and obesity. They indicated that empirical
studies measure time preferences with proxy variables such as saving rates, credit card debt,
personal savings, (lagged) debt to income ratios. Given the results from previous studies,
we hypothesize that gender di¤erences in subjective discount rates/time preferences could
crucially a¤ect self-reported health levels of individuals. Thus, we use smoking behavior as
a proxy for individual discount factors in this study.
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3.3 MODEL
Individuals derive utility from their health statuses and they respond to the changes in their
life-cyle health through a discount rate. Namely, an individual calculates his/her current
value of health as a sum of current and discounted future health benets. In this context,
we set up the current value of an individuals health as follows:
V (xit) = u(xit) + Et
(
TX
s=t+1
s ti u(xis)
)
(3.1)
where xit is the vector of observed characteristics of the individual, u(xit) is the utility
function and i is discount factor of the individual. Next, we make assumptions on the
functional form of the utility, which depends on observable individual characteristics.
Assumption 1 Suppose we have a linear health utility function of the following form where
 is the vector marginal utility coe¢ cients for observed characteristics and "it unboserved
component of utility:
u(xit) = 
0xit+"it (3.2)
Assumption 2 Suppose the unobserved component of the utility is independent across the
individuals and over time with a mean of zero. Thus, we have the followings:
1) E["it] = 0; 2) E["itjxit] = 0; 3) E["it"i0t] = 0; 4) E["it"is] = 0
Assumption 3 Suppose xit vector has four elements, a constant, education (x1), income
(x2) and age (x3), which a¤ect the health benets.
Using the linear utility function and replacing it into (3.1), we get:
V (xit) = 
0xit+"it+Et
(
TX
s=t+1
s ti (
0xis+"is)
)
Then, by assumptions 2 and 3, we write:
V (xit) = 0 + 1x1i+2x2it+3x3it+"it
+Et
(
TX
s=t+1
s ti [0+1x1it+2x2is+3x3is+"is]
)
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Assumption 4 For the sake of derivation, we assume an innite time horizon: i.e. T =1:
We note that this assumption is not critical for the validity of the results. Moreover,
for any future time s, age of an individual is written as follows: x3is= x3it+s  t: Then, the
value function of an indvidual is expressed as follows:
V (xit) = 0 + 1x1i+2x2it+3x3it+"it
+0
1X
s=t+1
s ti +
 
1
1X
s=t+1
s ti
!
Etfx1ig+ 2Et
( 1X
s=t+1
s ti x2is
)
+3Et
( 1X
s=t+1
s ti (x3it+s  t)
)
+Et
( 1X
s=t+1
s ti "is
)
We simplify the above expression by using the following facts:
1X
s=t+1
s ti =
i
1 i ,
TX
s=t+1
s ti (s  t) = i(1 i)2 :
Dening i=
i
1 i and using Etfx1ig = x1i; Etfx3itg = x3it; we write:
V (xit) = 0 + 1x1i+2x2it+3x3it+"it
+0i + 1ix1i + 2Et
( 1X
s=t+1
s ti x2is
)
+3ix3it + 3i(1 + i)+
1X
s=t+1
s ti Etf"isg
Finally, the last expression is equal to 0 by assumption 2.
V (xit) = 0 + 1x1i+2x2it+3x3it+"it+0i+1ix1i+
2Et
( 1X
s=t+1
s ti x2is
)
+3ix3it+3i(1 + i)
We follow Zabalza (1979)(125) for the evolution of an individuals income.
Assumption 5 Suppose that the future income of an individual depends on the current in-
come and the future income has the following trajectory: x2is= x2it(1 + (s  t)); where
 is the annual growth in real income over years.
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We plug this income trajectory into the valuation function and write:
V (xit) = 0 + 1x1i+2x2it+3x3it+"it+0i+1ix1i
+2Et
( 1X
s=t+1
s ti (x2it(1 + (s  t)))
)
+3ix3it+3i(1 + i)
Using Etfx2itg = x2it; we have:
V (xit) = (0+3i)(1 + i) + 1(1 + i)x1i+2(1 + i)(1 + i)x2it+3(1 + i)x3it+"it
(3.3)
The estimation model identies parameters for the value function:
V (xit) = 0+1x1i+2x2it+3x3it+"it (3.4)
where 0 = (0+3i)(1 + i); 1 = 1(1 + i); 2 = 2(1 + i)(1 + i) and 3 = 3(1 + i):
Since we can observe education, income and the age of an individual from a given survey
sample, the estimation of the model requires direct measures of health valuations given in
(3.4). However, in most data sets, we only observe self-assessed health outcomes rather than
a continuous measure for health benets/levels. Therefore, in order to make the model in
(3.1) operational, we need to dene an unobserved component, which takes the di¤erences
in self-assessed health (SAH) outcomes into account.
The health benets of an individual cannot be observed. However, as a function of
health benets, self-assessed health statuses are observed as a discrete variable. We dene
the relationship of the valuation function with discretely reported SAH categories as follows:
SAH i=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1 if  1 < V (xit)  c1
2 if c1< V (xit)  c2
3 if c2< V (xit)  c3
4 if c3< V (xit)  c4
5 if c4< V (xit)  1
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
Unlike general models using SAH measure, we hypothesize that SAH reects not only
current health but also life-time health benets. In fact, the two are not separable in an
economic context. Having the SAH measure as an indicator for the current health, most
models accumulate the e¤ects of life-cycle expectations into an unobserved component. The
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performance of SAH, in this framework, depends on empirical assumptions on an unob-
served error term of the model. This assumption determines the estimation model type used
in the literature. For instance, a normally distributed error term will lead to an ordered
probit whereas a logistic distribution assumption will drive an ordered logit model. In most
cases, the distributional assumption is the only way to assign a latent health to discrete
SAH outcomes. There is no direct method to test the validity of current health versus the
expectations augmented version considered in this paper. The error term mainly serves to
match latent continuous variable (health or expected discounted health, or anything else)
to discrete SAH categories. There is no theoretical framework to link what individuals re-
ally report as SAH and explanations for their incentives to do so. If their current health is
reported as SAH, how do they anticipate it? From an empirical point of view, one may spec-
ulate that reported current health may reect the result of an individuals criteria to judge
his/her current health conditions. Therefore, in this context, SAH still may be considered
as the current health; however, it may be a solution to a life-cyle problem for the individual.
In this paper, we address this problem and shed some light on the validity of augmenting
expectations in modelling for self-assessed health statuses.
If we assume that the current health benet is H, which is a function of the current
observed variables and an independent and identically distributed unobserved error term,
we would write:
H= u(xit) + "it (3.5)
Then depending on the assumption on the distribution of unobserved factor "it, the model
is an ordered logit or an ordered probit model with threshold parameters ci; i = 1; ::4: This
kind of a model can be estimated with a maximum likelihood method. However, the above
representation of the problem includes not only the current considerations but also the e¤ect
on life-cycle slope of the current health status. If the correct model is the health benets
model in equation (3.1) rather than the current health model in equation (3.5), then these
models will explain di¤erent structural e¤ects even there is an identical observed outcome.
We observe that the estimation equation (3.4) can only identify (1; 2; 3). In order to
obtain underlying utility parameters (0; 1; 2; 3), more assumptions are needed. We allow
a specic form of individual heterogeneity to identify the utility parameters. We have an
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individual specic discount factor variable dened as follows:
i=
i
1  i
We use i as a proxy for the subjective discount factor of an individual: i. Replacing the
corresponding terms in the estimation equation for the heterogeneity in individual subjective
discounting, we obtain:
V (xit) = (0+3i)(1 + i) + 1(1 + i)x1i+2(1 + i)(1 + i)x2it+3(1 + i)x3it+"it
Rearranging and collecting for similar terms, we write:
V (xit) = 0 + 0i+3
2
i+1(x1i+ix1i) + 2(x2i+ix2it)
+2(ix2it+
2
ix2it) + 3(x3i+ix3it) + "it (3.6)
The above estimation equation identies all the utility parameters including the coe¢ cient
of income growth, .
3.3.1 Accounting for Individual Subjective Discount Rates
The theoretical model with heterogeneity in individual discount factors enables us identify
the utility parameters. Since discount rates are shown to vary signicantly with respect to
socioeconomic conditions and demographics, we make an assumption on the functional form
of the relationship between individual discount rates and socioeconomic variables.
Assumption 6 Suppose that indiviual discount rates in our model is in the following linear
form:
i= 
0wi+ui (3.7)
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where  is a L 1 parameter vector and wi is a L 1 vector of containing socioeconomic
variables for an individual i. A naive estimation will take the predicted values ^i from
equation (3.7) and replace them into (3.6) to estimate the coe¢ cients . Moreover, we need
to correct for calculation of standard errors in the rst stage estimation.
The main hypothesis of this paper states that the coe¢ cients, ; identied in this frame-
work are signicantly di¤erent from the coe¢ cients identied without future looking struc-
ture. In the latter case, the coe¢ cients we can identify are f1; 2; 3g. An essential con-
tribution of this paper is the inclusion of stochastic individual specic discount rate. Even
if coe¢ cients of vector  turn out to be insignicant in equation (3.7), the existence of sto-
chastic discounting can lead to partial identication of the coe¢ cients. This paper addresses
these identication issues and the implications of assuming a discount function instead of
a xed discount rate. We use theoretical results to show that the gender gap in self-rated
health statuses, a puzzle in the health economics literature, can be explained by taking the
di¤erences in stochastic discounting into account.
3.3.2 A Simple Model
In order to evaluate the identication power of the structural model, lets assume a simpler
model with only education.
V (xit) = 0+1x1i+"it+0i+1ix1i
Replacing for i and using the linear functional form assumption, we write:
V (xit) =  0(1 + i) + 1(x1i+ix1i) + "it
V (xit) =  0(1 + 
0wi+ui) + 1(x1i+(
0wi+ui)x1i) + "it
V (xit) =  0+0
0wi+1x1i+1
0wix1i+(0ui+1uix1i+"it)
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Estimating this model is a di¢ cult task since health level measures are not continouous. The
SAH score of an individual allows us to write the model as follows:
H =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1 if 0+0
0wi+1x1i+1
0wix1i+(0ui+1uix1i+"it)  c1
2 if c1< 0 + 0
0wi + 1x1i + 1
0wix1i + (0ui + 1uix1i + "it)  c2
3 if c2< 0 + 0
0wi + 1x1i + 1
0wix1i + (0ui + 1uix1i + "it)  c3
4 if c3< 0 + 0
0wi + 1x1i + 1
0wix1i + (0ui + 1uix1i + "it)  c4
5 if c4< 0+0
0wi+1x1i+1
0wix1i+(0ui+1uix1i+"it)
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
Rewriting the expression just for the 1st and 2nd line, we get:
H =
(
1 if 0ui+1uix1i+"it c1 [0+00wi+1x1i+10wix1i]
2 if c1 [0+00wi+1x1i+10wix1i] < 0ui+1uix1i+"it c2 [0+00wi+1x1i+10wix1i]
)
We arrange terms and obtain:
H =
(
1 if (0+1x1i)ui+"it [c1 0 00wi 1x1i 10wix1i]
2 if [c1 0 00wi 1x1i 10wix1i] < (0+1x1i)ui+"it [c2 0 00wi 1x1i 10wix1i]
)
Assumption 7 We assume that ui and "it are both normally distributed as N(0; 
2
u) and
N(0; 2").
Assumption 8 We assume that the correlation between the unobserved components is :
This model will have the same structure as an ordered probit model, which allows het-
eroscedasticity in variance of the unobserved component. Therefore, the coe¢ cients are
identied (Greene and Hensher (2010a)(51)). Yet, identication of all parameters of the
model requires at least one shifter; a variable that a¤ects the subjective discount rate, but
not the subjective health outcome. The candidate variable for the shifter is identied by
many studies in the literature of subjective discounting. The commonly used variable in
this literature, possibly due to vast availability in the main data sets, is the smoking habit
of an individual. This variable has a strong positive correlation with risk-taking and time-
discounting behavior as discussed above. Clearly, smoking will be an endogenous variable
since it is expected that individuals who smoke would have relatively lower health status.
That would be a serious problem in a linear regression based setting; however, it can be
endogenized in our model by taking the correlation between "it and ui into account. Namely,
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unobserved factors a¤ecting an individuals discount factor (ui) will be correlated with unob-
served factors a¤ecting an individuals life-time utility from health ("it). Thus, our empirical
strategy will account estimating the correlation parameter, .
P (H = 1) = 

[c1 0 00wi 1x1i 10wix1i]p
(0+1x1i)
22u+
2
"+2u;"(0+1x1i)u"

P (H = 2) = 

[c2 0 00wi 1x1i 10wix1i]p
(0+1x1i)
22u+
2
"+2u;"(0+1x1i)u"

 

[c1 0 00wi 1x1i 10wix1i]p
(0+1x1i)
22u+
2
"+2u;"(0+1x1i)u"

Assumption 9 We assume that the variance of the unobserved factor " is 1: 2"= 1.
Under assumptions 8 and 9, the model is characterized by the following equations:
P (H = 1) = 

[c1 0 00wi 1x1i 10wix1i]p
(0+1x1i)
22u+1+2u;"(0+1x1i)u

P (H = 2) = 

[c2 0 00wi 1x1i 10wix1i]p
(0+1x1i)
22u+1+2u;"(0+1x1i)u

 

[c1 0 00wi 1x1i 10wix1i]p
(0+1x1i)
22u+1+2u;"(0+1x1i)u

P (H = 3) = 

[c3 0 00wi 1x1i 10wix1i]p
(0+1x1i)
22u+1+2u;"(0+1x1i)u

 

[c2 0 00wi 1x1i 10wix1i]p
(0+1x1i)
22u+1+2u;"(0+1x1i)u

P (H = 4) = 

[c4 0 00wi 1x1i 10wix1i]p
(0+1x1i)
22u+1+2u;"(0+1x1i)u

 

[c3 0 00wi 1x1i 10wix1i]p
(0+1x1i)
22u+1+2u;"(0+1x1i)u

P (H = 5) = 1  

[c4 0 00wi 1x1i 10wix1i]p
(0+1x1i)
22u+1+2u;"(0+1x1i)u

(3.8)
3.3.3 Identication
In order to clarify the identication of the model, we can write the estimation equation in
(3.8) in the following form:
P (H = 1) = 

c1
 
 0
 
 00
 
wi 1 x1i 1
0
 
wix1i

P (H = 2) = 

c2
 
 0
 
 00
 
wi 1 x1i 1
0
 
wix1i

 

c1
 
 0
 
 00
 
wi 1 x1i 1
0
 
wix1i

P (H = 3) = 

c3
 
 0
 
 00
 
wi 1 x1i 1
0
 
wix1i

 

c2
 
 0
 
 00
 
wi 1 x1i 1
0
 
wix1i

P (H = 4) = 

c4
 
 0
 
 00
 
wi 1 x1i 1
0
 
wix1i

 

c3
 
 0
 
 00
 
wi 1 x1i 1
0
 
wix1i

P (H= 5) = 1 

c4
 
 0
 
 00
 
wi 1 x1i 1
0
 
wix1i

(3.9)
where  2= (0+1x1i)
22u+1 + 2u;"(0+1x1i)u: In this form, we can easily evaluate vari-
ous aspects of the theoretical model. A basic ordered probit model will allow identication
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of the following list of coe¤cients: f c1
 
; c2
 
; c3
 
; c4
 
; 0
 
; 0
0
 
; 1
 
; 1
0
 
g. These coe¢ cients are con-
taminated with both cross-sectional variation across individuals (race, gender, income, etc)
and life-cycle aspects of health. As we suggested earlier, disantangling those e¤ects without
having a mechanism that generates the individul reporting behavior is not an easy task.
The thoretical model presented in the previous section does that by accounting for the indi-
vidualslifetime utility from health conditional on observed characteristics. In this section,
we show that the model parameters in equation (3.9) are individually identied. Therefore,
the utility function in (3.2) is also identied. This will constitute the bottom line of the
estimation framework. Since the utility function is specied for a period, the coe¤cients
f0; 1g will indicate the extent of the e¤ect of observed characteristics on the current util-
ity. In general, that kind of information cannot be derived directly from an ordered probit
analyisis.
The estimated coe¢ cients may have particularly useful policy implications. We con-
centrate on a special implication in this paper, which concentrates on the source of the
discrepancy in SAH reporting behaviour of men and women. The results presented have di-
rect implications for organizing a policy. If a policy maker only considers raw evidence from
the data literally, the data would imply that, on average, women in society are less healthy
than men with the same given characteristics. However, this result may not necessarily
be true since SAH reports the individualsown assesment of their current health statuses.
Therefore, any heterogeneity in reporting behaviour of individuals possibly can explain the
gender di¤erences in reporting. However, as in Soytas and Kose (2013)(110) and Denton
et al. (2004)(35), controlling for various observed characteristics and chronic illness does
not eliminate gender di¤erences in subjective health status. Additionally, Lindeboom and
van Doorslaer (2004)(81) stated that the gender and age of the respondents a¤ect reporting
behavior in Canadian survey. The mechanism developed in this paper will address the issue
and provide a channel to explain heterogeneity in reporting behavior. Equation (3.9) allows
us to identify the individual period utility function coe¢ cients, which are the marginal pe-
riod benets from various characteristics in constructing a health utility. We expect smaller
e¤ects in the period coe¢ cients, measured by f0; 1g; than the coe¤cients that would be
obtained from an ordered probit model, which relies on a generic utility.
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The functional form of our model in (3.9) is similar to a specication where a highly
nonlinear conditional mean function and heterogenous thresholds are accounted for in an
ordered probit estimation. Clearly, the specic form of non-linearity we impose here is a
direct result of the theoretical model. The fore-mentioned models are identied under general
conditions ((Greene and Hensher (2010a)(51)). The estimation identies f0; 1g, which are
the coe¢ cients of interest for our purposes. We use the Stata Package for estimating Ordinal
Generalized Linear Models (Williams (2010)(124)). This estimation framework addresses
the general nonlinear mean function (derived form from the valuation function in terms
of parameters and the data in our context) and is capable of allowing to specify for the
heteroskedasticity in the unobserved component4, (which is the term composed of the two
normal errors in the model).
3.4 DATA DESCRIPTION
We employ data from the U.S. National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) for 2012. The
self-assessed health status is coded as an ordinal variable. The corresponding question for
SAH reads: "What is the status of your health?"
SAHi =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
1 if individual reports "Poor"
2 if individual reports "Fair"
3 if individual reports "Good"
4 if individual reports "Very Good"
5 if individual reports "Excellent"
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
We use a dummy variable to control for gender. The female dummy is one if the individual
is a female and zero if the individual is a male. Similarly, we construct a dummy variable for
marital status. The unmarried category includes single, divorced, widowed, separated and
other individuals. We also construct dummy variables for ethnicity groups. We have data
on years of education for the respondents. The chronic illness dummy is one if individual
4The heteroskedasticity in the unobserved component is a way of using the general framework here. The
other approach would account for heterogenous thresholds. One may choose either approach depending on
the problem at hand and the structural parameters of interest. However, they do not much di¤er in terms
of construction of the estimation equation.
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Table 21: Descriptive Statistics for Year 2012
All Male Female
N % N % N %
Mean Mean Mean
Female 19,080 55.73
Married* 14,834 43.42 7,175 47.43 7,659 40.24
Age 34,238 48.49 15,158 47.98 19,080 48.90
(18.15) (17.59) (18.56)
Race
White 26,034 76.04 11,745 77.48 14,289 74.89
Black 5,453 15.93 2,147 14.16 3,306 17.33
Asian 2,230 6.51 1,029 6.79 1,201 6.29
Other 521 1.52 237 1.56 284 1.49
Education 34,098 14.80 15,083 14.81 19,015 14.79
(3.42) ( 3.45) (3.40)
Health Status 34,238 3.63 15,158 3.67 19,080 3.60
(1.09) (1.08) (1.09)
Excellent 8,810 25.73 4,083 26.94 10,340 26.17
Very good 10,671 31.17 4,770 31.47 12,125 30.69
Good 9,565 27.94 4,121 27.19 11,253 28.48
Fair 3,943 11.52 1,678 11.07 4,455 11.28
Poor 1,249 3.65 506 3.34 1,335 3.38
Chronic Illness 6,227 18.26 2,634 17.43 3,593 18.92
Employment
Employed 21,862 63.85 10,588 69.85 11,274 59.09
Not employed 12,376 36.15 4,570 30.15 7,806 40.91
Ownhouse 20,106 58.80 9,018 59.56 11,088 58.19
Family size 34,238 2.37 15,158 2.31 19,080 2.41
(1.46) (1.44) (1.47)
Family Income** 34,238 54.19 15,158 57.94 19,080 51.21
(46.56) (47.62) (45.48)
# of Children 34,238 0.59 15,158 0.49 19,080 0.66
(1.04) (0.97) (1.09)
BMI 34,238 30.16 15,158 29 19,080 31.07
(14.28) (10.05) (16.84)
Smoking
Never 20,225 59.07 7,909 52.18 12,316 59.07
Former 7,580 22.14 3,964 26.15 3,616 22.14
Some Day 1,481 4.33 788 5.20 693 3.63
Every Day 4,952 14.46 2,497 16.47 2,455 12.87
*Single, widowed, divorced and other categories in marital status and coded as "unmarried."
** Family income is represented in thousands of dollars.
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has limited activity due to a chronic illness and zero otherwise. We consider a dummy for
employment status. Ownhouse dummy is one if the individual is living in a family owned
house and zero otherwise. Family size measures the number of people for the household in
which the respondent lives. Annual family income corresponds to individuals total family
income in thousands of dollars. We have the data for the number of children living in the
household in which the respondent also lives. Body mass index is a continuous variable
obtained by the ratio of weight and height of the respondent. Smoking data is recoded as a
dummy variable according to the degree of smoking habit.
The descriptive statistics for the relevant variables are provided in Table 21. We consider
individuals older than the age of 18: a total of 34,238 respondents. Females constitute 55.7%
of the sample and 43.42% of the sample are married. The mean age is 48.49 and 76.04%
of the sample report their ethnicity as Caucasian. The average year of schooling is 14.8
for the whole sample. 25.73% of all respondents report excellenthealth. Women report
lower health statuses on average. Namely, the average health status of men is 3.67 whereas
that of women is 3.60. Moreover, 18.26% of the sample report chronic illnesses. 69.85% of
males are employed whereas 59.09% of women do have a job which is in line with labor force
participation rates in the U.S5. The average annual family income for the sample is $54,190.
The mean of family size is 2.37 and 58.80% of all respondents live in a family owned house.
The average number of children in the household is 0.59 whereas the average body mass
index of the sample reads 30.16. Finally, 59.07% of the sample does not as 14.46% smoke
everyday.
3.5 ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
We will estimate the dynamic model and extend it by including other controls in the utility
for health equation. Enhancing the model will only change the number of parameters to be
estimated in reduced form representation in equation (3.9) using the value function form in
equation in (3.3). Although this approach will have more parameters to estimate, identica-
5According to World Bank data, female
labor force participation rate was 58% whereas male labor force participation rate was 70% in 2010. The
total labor force participation rate of the U.S. was 65% in 2010.
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tion of the structural parameters in equation (3.9) follows the same line of arguments of the
basic model. The proxy variable for the individual discount rate equation will be smoking
habits as described in the data set. The unobserved factors are allowed to be dependent
and an ordered probiy specication with only linear terms will also be estimated for com-
parison. The equation in (3.8) ts into the framework of heterogeneous choice/location-scale
models (Greene and Hensher (2010a)(51); Williams (2009)(123)). In these models, het-
erogeneity in response is modeled through various extensions of basic ordered probit/logit
models. One of those extensions is modeling the error variance as a function of individual
characteristics instead of assuming a constant variance. When an ordinal regression model
incorrectly assumes that error variances are the same for all cases, standard errors are not
correct and the parameter estimates are biased (Greene and Hensher (2010b)(52); Greene
and Hensher (2007)(50)). Heterogeneous choice/location-scale models explicitly specify the
determinants of heteroskedasticity in an attempt to correct it. Further, these models can be
used when the variance/variability of underlying attitudes is itself of a substantive interest.
For instance, Alvarez and Brehm (1995)(2) argued that individuals whose core values are
in conict will have a harder time making a decision about abortion and hence, they will
have greater variability/error variances in their responses. Having the heteroscedasticity
assumption practically improves estimation t by modelling the heterogeneity in responses
from one aspect; whereas its implications in terms of the estimated models structural pa-
rameters is not clear. However, the model in equation in (3.8), as a solution to a dynamic
problem, ts into the estimation framework of heterogeneous choice/ location-scale models.
Thus, we conclude that the dynamic model accounting for the heterogeneity in individual
responses is likely to improve the t of the model; which is in line with empirical evidence
on heterogeneous choice/ location-scale models (Greene and Hensher (2010a)(51); Williams
(2009)(123)). In contrast to empirical applications of the sort mentioned, the structural
model gives us an explanation for the di¤erences in response. The contribution of our model
is in the identication of the mechanism behind the heterogeneous choice/ location-scale
models.
In order to estimate the structural model parameters, we employ Ordinal Generalized
Linear Model estimation method proposed by Williams (2010)(124). In Table 22, we report
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Table 22: Comparison of Ordered Probit and Structural Model Results
Ordered Probit Structual Model Ratio
Female -0.04686 -0.03681 1.27309
Age -0.01089 -0.00965 1.12787
Black -0.25184 -0.21658 1.16284
Asian -0.15741 -0.13842 1.13718
Other Race -0.26283 -0.22504 1.16794
Education 0.05028 0.04349 1.15609
Family Income 0.00298 0.00228 1.30424
Chronic -1.15312 -1.01383 1.13739
estimation results with ordered probit the rst column and second column reports the results
for the structural model. Reported, , coe¢ cients in the structural estimation are the
utility parameters of the race, education, gender, income and chronic illness variables. The
changes in the coe¢ cients from the ordered probit model to the structural model results
are substantial, which has causal implications on the structural model. The decline in the
female coe¢ cient is 21%. Apart from that; all other coe¢ cients drop signicantly. These
results are consistent with and expected from the framework of forward looking optimization
behavior of individuals since utility coe¢ cients now only capture period returns. In the
ordered probit estimation, the same factors are loaded with larger e¤ects since they are
contaminated with the life-cycle e¤ects. For instance, the coe¢ cient of education in the
ordered probit estimation is 0.0502 whereas that coe¢ cient in the structural model is only
0.0434. In terms of explaining the gender gap in self-assessed health status, heterogeneity in
the discount factor via our theoretical model explains substantial part of it.
We report detailed estimates of ordered probit model in Table 23 and provide marginal ef-
fects in Table 24. Similarly, Table 25 and 26 provide detailed estimation results and marginal
e¤ects for the structural model. The estimated relationship between self-reported health sta-
tus and explanatory variables are in line with previous ndings. Namely, self-assessed health
statuses are positively associated with income and education whereas it is negatively cor-
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related with age. The non-linear e¤ect of income on self-rated health status is observed in
the structural model estimations. Females signicantly report lower health statuses than
males. African-Americans signicantly report lower health statuses than Caucasian respon-
dents. Self-assessed health statuses have negative correlation with chronic illness conditions
and smoking habits. There are di¤erences in marginal e¤ects reported by the ordered probit
and structural model ndings. Although ordered probit estimates reveal signicant gender
e¤ects on all self-rated health levels, structural model identies di¤erent e¤ects. Ordered
probit results imply that females are more likely to report lower levels of health status, i.e.
"poor," "fair" and "good" and less likely to report higher levels, i.e. "very good" and "ex-
cellent." The structural model identies gender di¤erences only for reporting "fair," "good"
and "excellent" health status. Namely, females are more likely to report "fair" and "good"
and less likely to report "excellent" for their health statuses. These results support our hy-
pothesis that there is reporting heterogeneity in self-rated health statuses, mostly explained
by heterogeneous individual discount factors of the survey respondent.
Obviously, the estimated relationship via Ordinal Generalized Linear Model estimation
method can only reveal the coe¤cients associated with the utility parameters () and utility
specication. The remaining parameters of the model may be estimated as well to get
their numerical values. However, the main interest of this paper focuses on the period
utility and a more complex estimation method via maximum likelihood is required for full
estimation of the equation in (3.9), which is left for another work. The main nding of
the paper is that the heterogenity in SAH response can be accounted to some extent with
the inclusion of heterogenity in discount factors. There may be other possible explanations
to the abnormality in the data about male-female di¤erences in SAH reporting such as
heterogeneity in risk taking and perception of scales for health statuses. The anchoring
vignettes is a possible way to check the reporting di¤erences in the individual outcomes.
This technique will require some proxy for the actual health outcomes of individuals in the
data set. Then, the implied thresholds may be checked with the various health outcomes,
such as the tests for diabeties, blood pressure, etc. This method still lacks the mechanism
that generates the observed di¤erences, but provides explanations in terms of exploring
another form of heterogeneity.
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Table 23: Ordered Probit Results
Female -0.0469***
[0.0147]
Age -0.0109***
[0.000415]
Black -0.252***
[0.0196]
Asian -0.157***
[0.0272]
Other Race -0.263***
[0.0597]
Education 0.0503***
[0.00221]
Family Income 0.00298***
[0.000168]
Chronic Illness -1.153***
[0.0218]
Smoking -0.113***
[0.0313]
Smoking x Female 0.00290
[0.0110]
Smoking x Age 0.00105***
[0.00349]
Smoking x Black 0.0463***
[0.0147]
Smoking x Asian 0.0125
[0.0267]
Smoking x Other Race 0.0119
[0.0426]
Smoking x Education -0.00431**
[0.00188]
Smoking x Family Income 0.000198
[0.000152]
Smoking x Chronic Illness -0.0196
[0.0144]
Cut 1 -2.286***
[0.0418]
Cut 2 -1.252***
[0.0398]
Cut 3 -0.154***
[0.0394]
Cut 4 0.811***
[0.0395]
N 33,960
1) White is the base group for the race.
2) Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
79
Table 24: Marginal E¤ects for Ordered Probit
Self Reported Health Poor (1) Fair (2) Good (3) Very Good (4) Excellent (5)
Probability 0.0109 0.0930 0.3319 0.3534 0.2105
Female 0.00134*** 0.00709*** 0.0100*** -0.00489*** -0.0136***
Age 0.000314*** 0.00165*** 0.00232*** -0.00114*** -0.00314***
Black 0.00889*** 0.0416*** 0.0494*** -0.0324*** -0.0676***
Asian 0.00531*** 0.0256*** 0.0315*** -0.0196*** -0.0429***
Other Race 0.0102*** 0.0452*** 0.0492*** -0.0366*** -0.0679***
Education -0.00145*** -0.00763*** -0.0107*** 0.00529*** 0.0145***
Family Income -0.00008*** -0.000452*** -0.000635*** 0.000313*** 0.000859***
Chronic Illness 0.0824*** 0.223*** 0.123*** -0.192*** -0.236***
Smoking 0.00324*** 0.0171*** 0.0240*** -0.0118*** -0.0325***
SmokingxFemale -0.00008 -0.000441 -0.000619 0.000305 0.000838
SmokingxAge -0.00003*** -0.000159*** -0.000223*** 0.000110*** 0.000302***
SmokingxBlack -0.00133*** -0.00702*** -0.00986*** 0.00486*** 0.0134***
SmokingxAsian -0.000361 -0.00190 -0.00268 0.00132 0.00362
SmokingxOther Race -0.000342 -0.00180 -0.00253 0.00125 0.00342
SmokingxEducation 0.000124** 0.000655** 0.000920** -0.000454** -0.00125**
SmokingxFamily Income -0.000005 -0.00003 -0.00004 0.00002 0.00005
SmokingxChronic Illness 0.000565 0.00298 0.00418 -0.00206 -0.00566
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 25: Structural Model Results
Self Rated Health ln(sigma)
Female -0.0368*** -0.00776
[0.0126] [0.0105]
Age -0.00965*** 0.00146
[0.000656] [0.00168]
Black -0.217*** 0.0284**
[0.0210] [0.0142]
Asian -0.138*** 0.0218
[0.0241] [0.0218]
Other Race -0.225*** 0.0550
[0.0597] [0.0413]
Education 0.0435*** -0.00746
[0.00310] [0.00665]
Family Income 0.00228*** -0.00224***
[0.000195] [0.000374]
Chronic Illness -1.014*** 0.175***
[0.0629] 0.0149
Smoking -0.109***
[0.0313]
Smoking x Female 0.00180
[0.00950]
Smoking x Age 0.000975***
[0.000308]
Smoking x Black 0.0336**
[0.0133]
Smoking x Asian 0.0101
[0.0227]
Smoking x Other Race 0.0112
[0.0393]
Smoking x Education -0.00294*
[0.00173]
Smoking x Family Income 0.000199
[0.000125]
Smoking x Chronic Illness -0.0285**
[0.0142]
Age2 -0.000015
[0.0000161]
Education2 -0.000146
[0.000263]
Family Income2 0.0000083***
[0.000002]
Cut 1 -2.103***
[0.133]
Cut 2 -1.089***
[0.0755]
Cut 3 -0.123***
[0.0365]
Cut 4 0.677***
[0.0516]
N 33,960
1) White is the base group for the race.
2) Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 26: Marginal E¤ects for Structural Model
Self Reported Health Poor (1) Fair (2) Good (3) Very Good (4) Excellent (5)
Probability 0.0073 0.0981 0.3469 0.3407 0.2066
Female 0.000492 0.00559** 0.0106*** -0.00255 -0.0141***
Age 0.000304*** 0.00210*** 0.00215*** -0.00166*** -0.00289***
Black 0.00852*** 0.0497*** 0.0421*** -0.0399*** -0.0604***
Asian 0.00543*** 0.0321*** 0.0269*** -0.0260*** -0.0383***
Other Race 0.0123*** 0.0571*** 0.0327** -0.0480*** -0.0540***
Education -0.00141*** -0.00959*** -0.00953*** 0.00773*** 0.0128***
Family Income -0.000166*** -0.000833*** -0.000166** 0.000924*** 0.000241**
Chronic Illness 0.0987*** 0.241*** 0.0660*** -0.199*** -0.207***
Smoking 0.00260*** 0.0206*** 0.0272*** -0.0141*** -0.0363***
SmokingxFemale -0.00004 -0.000341 -0.000450 0.000233 0.000601
SmokingxAge -0.00002*** -0.000185*** -0.000244*** 0.000126*** 0.000326***
Smoking Black -0.000803** -0.00638** -0.00841** 0.00436** 0.0112**
SmokingxAsian -0.000241 -0.00192 -0.00252 0.00131 0.00337
SmokingxOther Race -0.000268 -0.00213 -0.00281 0.00146 0.00376
SmokingxEducation 0.00007* 0.000559* 0.000736* -0.000381* -0.000984*
SmokingxFamily Income -0.000004 -0.00003 -0.00004 0.00002 0.00006
SmokingxChronic Illness 0.000681** 0.00541** 0.00713** -0.00369** -0.00953**
Age2 -0.0000007 -0.000002 0.000002 0.000004 -0.000003
Education2 -0.000007 -0.00002 0.00002 0.00004 -0.00003
Family Income2 0.0000004*** 0.000001*** -0.000001*** -0.000002*** 0.000001***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.6 CONCLUSION
There are signicant gender di¤erences in self-assessed health statuses. Male survey respon-
dents signicantly report higher subjective health statuses then their female counterparts.
Biological factors, socioeconomic factors or a combination of both are stated as explanations
for the gender gap. The gender e¤ect signicantly persists even if di¤erent factors and social
mechanisms are taken into account (Walters et al. 2002(121); Denton et al. 2004(35); Soytas
and Kose (2013)(110)). Reviewing previous ndings, Soytas and Kose (2013)(110) showed
that there remains a signicant gender gap in self reported health status even after con-
trol of chronic illness conditions unlike the earlier ndings (see Case and Paxson 2005 (21);
Malmusi et al. 2012(83)). There is also evidence of reporting heterogeneity in self-assessed
health statuses indicated in Canadian, American and Turkish data (Lindeboom and van
Doorslaer 2004(81); Soytas and Kose (2013)(110)).
Given the attempts and explanations provided by the literature, there still remains an
unexplained signicant portion of the gender gap in self-reported health statuses. In an
e¤ort to ll this gap and provide a more robust framework to explain the gender gap in
self-reported health levels, we present a theoretical identication mechanism via a dynamic
set-up. The model asserts that the current utility associated with the current health state is
the solution to a dynamic problem, which includes discounted sums of future utilities. The
theoretical model takes heterogeneity in individual discount rates into account and provide
an identication mechanism. We hypothesize that heterogeneity in individual discount rates
would lead to reporting heterogeneity in self-assessed health status. Thus, this paper suggests
that the gender di¤erences in subjective discount rates could crucially a¤ect self-reported
health levels of individuals.
Employing the U.S. National Health Interview Survey of 2012 and using smoking habits
as a proxy for individual discount rates, we estimate the structural model coe¢ cients and
compare them with an ordered probit estimation. Supporting the theoretical predictions,
results indicate magnitude di¤erences across the coe¢ cients of ordered probit model and the
structural model. Moreover, structural models identify di¤erent marginal e¤ects of being
female on likelihood of reporting various subjective health status levels. The main nding
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of the paper is that the heterogenity in SAH response can be accounted to some extent
with the inclusion of heterogenity in discount factors. This paper presents theoretical and
empirical results to show that a puzzle in health outcomes, i.e., the gender gap in self-assessed
health status, may be substantially explained once the di¤erences in stochastic discounting
are taken into account. Thus, policy makers and future research should take heterogeneity
in individual discount rates into account when addressing the gender di¤erences in health
outcomes. However, the ndings of the paper should be treated as an upper bound for the
e¤ect of heterogeneity individual discount rates on subjective assessment of health levels.
Heterogeneity in risk taking, perception of scales, framing e¤ects and unobserved factors
in smoking habit may also contribute to reporting heterogeneity in self-rated health status.
Future work should consider direct measures of indvidual discount factors and risk taking
behavior of individuals to identify their e¤ects on the gender gap in self-reported health
statuses.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
A. DERIVATION OF FUNDAMENTAL VALUES
Fundamental Value for Treatment 3
In two markets of this treatment, there is a change in the bankruptcy probability and thus fundamental
value calculations are adjusted accordingly for these markets. The realized fundamental value of an asset
for period 1, of the second market in session 1, is given by the following:
FV (1) =
16X
s=1
(0:875)s 1
1
2
(57  s) +
20X
s=17
(0:875)s 1
1
2
(57  s) +
1X
s=21
(0:875)s 1
1
2
(57  s)
I calculate the corresponding values for rst two sums and approximate the last term by the following
summation since the discounting term will be close to zero for further terms. Fundamental values for other
periods and second session are calculated in a similar fashion.
1X
s=21
(0:875)s 1
1
2
(57  s) 
100X
s=21
(0:875)s 1
1
2
(57  s)
Fundamental Value for Treatment 4
In two markets of this treatment, there is a change in the bankruptcy probability and thus fundamental
value calculations are adjusted accordingly for these markets.The realized fundamental value of an asset for
period 1, of the fourth market in session 1, is given by the following:
FV (1) =
12X
s=1
(0:875)s 1
s
2
+
1X
s=13
(0:75)s 1
s
2
I calculate the corresponding values for rst two sums and approximate the last term by the following
summation since the discounting term will be close to zero for further terms. Fundamental values for other
periods and the third market of the second session are calculated in a similar fashion.
1X
s=13
(0:75)s 1
s
2

100X
s=13
(0:75)s 1
s
2
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B. EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS
I provide experimental instructions for Treatment 3, i.e. decreasing fundamentals, in this section. In-
structions for other treatments of the experiment are similar and available upon request.
1. General Instructions
Welcome to todays experiment. This is an experiment on economic decision making. Please read the
instructions carefully since they explain how you will earn money from decisions you make throughout the
experiment. Your earnings from the experiment will be paid to you in cash at the end of the session. Please
do not talk to any other participants during the experiment. If you have any questions, raise your hand and
an experimenter will come to you to answer it.
2. Description of the Market
In this experiment you will have an opportunity to buy and sell in a market by using experimental cash.
The experimental cash (EC) will be converted into dollars at the end of the session. The exchange rate will
be 2000 EC = $1. At the start of the experiment, you will have a portfolio which consists of Assets (A) and
experimental cash (EC). Your starting portfolio will be randomly assigned by the computer and will be one
of the following: Portfolio 1 = (20A, 3000 EC) or Portfolio 2 = (60A, 1000 EC). There are 10 participants
in todays experiment. Half of the participants will have Portfolio 1 whereas the other half will start with
Portfolio 2. Thus, you have an equal chance of receiving Portfolio 1 or 2.
Once the experiment starts, you will see the number of assets and the amount of experimental cash
you have on the screen. The experiment consists of a number of trading periods. Each trading period lasts
2 minutes. The number of trading periods will be randomly determined; this process is explained below.
Within each trading period, you can buy and sell assets. You will see the time left in the trading period on
your computer screen. Your assets and experimental cash balance will carry over to the next period if the
experiment continues for another period.
3. Properties of the Asset
At the end of each period, you will receive a return (dividend) for each unit of the asset you hold. There
will be two potential dividend amounts, 0 or 57-t, in each period, where t is the number of the period you
are in. The computer randomly determines whether you receive 0 EC or 57-t EC for each unit of the asset.
Each outcome is equally likely. Note that if the market reaches the 57th period, the asset will pay a dividend
of 0 EC. Moreover, if the market continues for more than 57 rounds, the dividend payments (57-t) will be
negative. Namely, you may lose some experimental cash depending on the dividend payment of the asset
after period 57.
Probability Dividend
50% 0
50% 57-t
The table indicates that the expected dividend of an asset will be (0.50 * (0) + 0.50 * (57-t)) = 28.5-0.5*t
for period t. Note that the amount of EC paid in one period will not a¤ect the amount of EC paid in any
other period. At the end of each period, the dividend amount will be determined and your holdings will be
updated accordingly. The potential dividend payments for each period are listed in the Information Table
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below. For example, if the period 5 is reached, 0 EC and 52 EC are possible dividends. If the period 22 is
reached, 0 EC and 35 EC are possible dividend payments.
4. Use of Computerized Trading System
Within each trading period, you can buy and sell assets. In order to buy units of Asset (A), you need
to have experimental cash and pay the transaction price. You may sell your assets and receive an amount
of experimental cash equal to the transaction price. You can increase your cash holdings by selling an asset.
Buying an asset will decrease your cash holdings. You can buy and sell units of Asset by posting bids
(o¤ers to buy) and asks(o¤ers to sell) which are described below.
If you would like to sell an asset you can submit an "ask" by inputting the price and quantity of the
assets you are willing to sell at that price. If one of the other participants accepts your ask, then you sell
the number of assets s/he buys and your experimental cash holdings will increase by the transaction price.
If you would like to buy an asset you can submit a "bid" by inputting the price and quantity of the
assets you are willing to buy. If one of the sellers accepts your bid, then you get the asset and pay for it.
Then your experimental cash holdings will decrease by transaction price.
Just as you can post bids and asks, you can also buy or sell assets from the bids and asks
posted by other participants.
You can buy and sell more than one unit of the asset in a given period. When the trading period ends,
your asset holdings and cash balance will be updated. During each period, as long as you have su¢ cient
assets and cash balance, you may buy and sell assets as often as you like.
You can submit your asks (i.e. your o¤ers to sell) and bids (your o¤ers to buy) at prices ranging from
0 to 999 EC. For every bid/ask you make, you have to enter the number of assets you would like to trade
as well. You can submit more than one bid/ask but you cannot cancel your bids/asks. Note that your asset
holdings cannot be less than zero.
The gure below shows the trading screen you will use during the experiment. It explains how you trade
in the market. Please analyze it carefully and if you have any questions, please raise your hand. Note that
the numbers in the gure are just examples.
5. Time Horizon and Average Holding Value Table
In this market, the number of trading periods will be randomly determined. After a trading period ends,
whether you proceed to the next period will be determined randomly. This randomization occurs by rolling
an 8 sided die. This die has 8 sides numbered from 1 to 8. After each trading period, one of the participants
will roll the die. If the die lands on a number larger than 1, the market proceeds to another trading period.
If the die lands on 1, the market will end. Notice that at the end of a trading period the probability of
having one more trading period is 87.5% whereas the probability of the market ending is 12.5%.
After a market ends, you MAY be asked to participate for another market in identical conditions. Note
that each market may have a di¤erent number of trading periods, depending on chance (i.e. die roll).
Moreover, if any of the markets you participate in does not end in the given amount of time for experiment,
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Figure 5: Double Auction Trading Screen
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the experimenter keeps rights to change the market ending probability to nish the experiment and randomly
determine the number of trading periods.
You can use the information on the Average Holding Value table to help you make decisions. The rst
column indicates the current period during which the average holding value is calculated. The expected
dividend column reveals the expected experimental cash payments of an asset in each period. The third
column indicates the average holding value of an asset at a given period. The average holding value indicates
the expected future earnings from each stock that you hold for the rest of the market. Given the properties
and market continuation probability, the average holding value (AHV) an asset in this market is calculated
by the following formula.
AVH =200 - 4t for any period t=1, 2, 3 . . . .
For example, at period 11, AVH becomes 200-4*11=156. At period 21, AVH becomes 200-4*21=116.
Note that the AVH table displays the potential rounds to which the market game may reach. The full table
for potential rounds is given at the end of instructions.
6. Payment
At the end of each trading period, your holdings will possibly consist of assets and/or experimental
cash. The market will end if the die reads 1 and your assets will be worthless at the end of the experiment.
Thus, you will have only experimental cash. Using the conversion rate 2000 experimental currency = $1, the
computer will calculate your dollar earnings. Since the end of the experiment will be randomly determined,
the computer will calculate your potential earnings for each period. When a trading period ends, you will
be able to see dollar value of your experimental cash holdings. This value is calculated by the following
formula: Dollar Value of Your Portfolio= (Money)/2000. This will be your earnings from the experiment if
the die reads one at the end of that period. Your total payment will be your earnings from the experiment
plus a show up fee of $5. If you participate in more than one market, one of the markets will be randomly
selected to determine your payment for the experiment. The experimenter may label the market numbers
and put them in an urn and may ask you to pick a number from the urn. Or you may be asked to roll a die
to determine the market for payment. Then, you will be paid for selected market and you will also receive
the show up fee.
7. History Screen
The following gure is an example of the history screen you will see at the end of each period. When
you see this information, the experimenter will stop the experiment and the die roll will determine whether
the experiment will continue or not. Please analyze it carefully and if you any questions, raise your hand.
Note that the numbers in the gure are just examples and you may face with di¤erent numbers during the
experiment.
8. Die Roll Screen
After each trading period, you will face with the following DIE ROLL screen. Please wait for the die
roll and use the earnings table to write down Dollar Value of Your Portfolio if the market ends. Please
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Figure 6: Trading Period History Screen
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DO NOT click on CONTINUEbutton before the experimenter tells you to do so.
9. Review Questions/Quiz
Q1: How many trading periods you will have in this market?
a) 5 b) 15 c) Depends on the roll of the die.
Q2: How much time will you have for trading in each period?
a) 120 seconds b) 90 seconds c) 60 seconds
Q3: Will the assets you hold always pay experimental cash of 0?
a) Yes b) No c) Depends on the computers choice.
Q4: Is it possible that your asset holdings will have negative returns?
a) Yes b) No c) Depends on computers choice and die roll.
Q5: Will you learn the dividend payment of the asset at the beginning of trading period?
a) Yes b) No c) Depends on computers choice.
Q6: If the market reaches period 16, what will be the average holding value of an asset in this period?
a) 96 b) 136 c) 146 d) 166
Q7: If you hold 50 Assets and 2000 Experimental Cash at the end of a trading period and the die reads
2, what will be your earnings from the experiment including show up fee?
a) 2 b) 7 c) Do Not Know
Summary of Important Information
1. Each trading period lasts for 120 seconds.
2. The assets have dividend of 0 EC or 57-t EC with equal probability at the end of each period t.
3. The market ends (when the die reads 1) at the end of a period with a probability of 12.5%.
4. Each unit of the asset will be worthless when the market ends.
C. ANALYSIS FOR TREATMENT 0
In this section, I analyze the data for Treatment 0, i.e. constant fundamental value treatment of Kirchler
et al. (2012)(74). Figures 9 and 10 present trend of transaction prices for six market sessions lasting 10
periods. As noted above these markets are identical with Treatment 1, except the xed number of trading
periods.
Overall, prices and fundamentals exhibit similar trends except session four which reveals 30% underpric-
ing on average according to Table 27. Although comparison tests, presented in Table 28, reveal signicant
price deviation for most markets, bubble measures imply that deviations are less than 4% on average
for most markets. Thus, Treatment 0 and Treatment 1 of our study reveal similar outcomes in terms of
transaction prices. The convergence to fundamental value occurs from below in session three and from above
in session ve. In other sessions, transaction prices are both below and above the fundamental value for
di¤erent periods. The evidence on portfolio adjustments is mixed. According to Table 27, stock holdings of
subjects are more balanced in session three. Fourth session has the highest concentration ratio, 0.77, for end
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Figure 7: Die Roll Screen
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Figure 8: Average Holding Value: Information Table
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Figure 9: Trading Prices for Treatment 0 (Constant Fundamentals with Terminal Value)
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Figure 10: Trading Prices for Treatment 0 (Constant Fundamentals with Terminal Value)
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Table 27: Bubble Measures and Ginis Concentration Ratios: Treatment 0
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 Session 6
Bubble Measures
RAD 0.0042 0.006 0.040 0.362 0.024 0.034
RD -0.0007 0.006 -0.040 -0.355 0.024 0.005
N 10 10 10 10 10 10
End of Market Gini Concentration Ratios
Endowment 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Market 0.54 0.51 0.37 0.77 0.48 0.66
of market distribution of asset holdings. Ranging from 0.37 to 0.77, the concentration ratios of treatment
zero are higher than that of treatment one. Finally, Table 28 provides mixed test results for the comparison
of prices in Treatments 0 and 1. Namely I test the hypothesis that transaction prices in markets of treatment
zero is equal to transaction prices in markets of treatment one. Weighted mean prices signicantly di¤er
across some markets of two market treatments. For instance, z-values for mean price comparison for market
four and ve of Treatment 0 and markets of Treatment 1 are signicant at 5% level. However, comparison of
prices for market six provides insignicant z-statistics: -0.70 and 0.14 for market two and three of treatment
one, respectively.
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Table 28: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for Weighted Mean Prices: z values
Ho: Prices (Mi) = Prices(Mj) i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g and j 2 f1; 2; 3g
Treatment 1
Treatment 0 Market 1 Market 2 Market 3
Market 1 -2.80*** -1.82* -0.28
Market 2 -2.80*** -2.52** -1.26
Market 3 -1.27 1.68* 1.82*
Market 4 -2.59*** -2.52** 2.52**
Market 5 -2.80*** -2.52** -2.38**
Market 6 -2.59*** -0.70 0.14
1) I consider rst markets of each session for Treatment 1 and all markets of Treatment 0.
2) Quantity weighted mean prices are compared across markets.
3) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Table 29: Paired t and Wilcoxon signed-ranked tests for Treatment 0: All Transaction
Prices,Weighted Mean Prices, Fundamental Values: t and z values
Ho: Prices=Fundamentals
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 Session 6
t(all) 0.34 7.15*** -10.96*** -16.01*** 16.24*** 3.79***
z(all) 2.72*** 5.48*** -13.99*** -15.23*** 10.18*** 7.81***
N 174 171 343 358 157 272
t(mean) -0.26 5.14*** -3.54*** -5.71*** 7.91*** 0.31
z(mean) 1.37 2.80*** -2.80*** -2.70*** 2.80*** 0.76
N 10 10 10 10 10 10
1) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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